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JSA represented Chemco Plastic Industries Private Limited in obtaining an injunction restraining Chemco Plast from infringing its registered trademark ‘CHEMCO’

JSA Advocates and Solicitors represented Chemco Plastic Industries Private Limited in obtaining an injunction restraining Chemco Plast from infringing its registered trademark ‘CHEMCO’

By an order dated 03 December 2025 (“Order”), a single judge of the Bombay High Court partly allowed an Interim Application (“Application”) filed by Chemco Plastic Industries Private Limited (“CPIPL”) in a Commercial IP Suit (“Suit”) seeking a temporary injunction restraining M/s. Chemco Plast (“Chemco Plast”) from infringing CPIPL’s registered trademark ‘CHEMCO’.

CPIPL had filed the Suit inter alia seeking an injunction restraining Chemco Plast from infringing its registered trademark ‘CHEMCO’. In its Application, CPIPL inter alia contended that: (i) CPIPL is the prior adopter and registered proprietor of the mark ‘CHEMCO’; (ii) there is incontrovertible evidence to demonstrate that Chemco Plast has been using the mark ‘CHEMCO’, the trading name ‘CHEMCO PLAST’, and the domain name ‘www.chemcoplast.com’; (iii) Chemco Plast has not secured any registration of its impugned mark; (iv) the goods manufactured and sold by CPIPL and Chemco Plast are similar and their marks are identical; (v) the rival goods, which are similar, are sold by both the parties through the same trade channels and the parties have common purchasers. Accordingly, confusion has and is bound to arise in the minds of discerning customers; (vi) given that the rival marks and goods are identical, infringement of CPIPL’s mark squarely falls within the ambit of Section 29 (2) (c) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (“Act”) and thus, it must be presumed that the use of the impugned trade mark by Chemco Plast is likely to cause confusion as set out under Section 29 (3) of the Act; and (vii) CPIPL’s mark ‘CHEMCO’ is a well-known mark. Consequently, the use of the impugned mark by Chemco Plast, even if in respect of dissimilar goods amounts to infringement of CPIPL’s mark under Section 29 (4) of the Act.

The Hon’ble Court inter alia held that:

The goods manufactured by CPIPL and Chemco Plast have an element of similarity. The specific products, variety, and refinement may be different, however, by and large both parties are prima facie engaged in the manufacture of plastic products which cater to the same customers, have similar trade channels, and are put to similar use.
There was material on record to prima facie demonstrate that Chemco Plast has used and / or attempted to use ‘CHEMCO’ as a mark, such as below:
- Attempting to register the mark ‘CHEMCO’ and ‘CHEMCO PLAST’, claiming user from 1977 and 1998 respectively.
- Using the mark along with ‘CHEMCO PLAST’ in the invoices raised by Chemco Plast.
- Filing an affidavit in support of an application filed by Chemco Plast for registration of the mark ‘CHEMCO’ under Class 21 before the Trade Marks Registry, wherein the partner of Chemco Plast had on oath affirmed that the trademark ‘CHEMCO’ had been used by Chemco Plast continuously since 22 August 1998.
- The website of Chemco Plast revealing that ‘CHEMCO’, , and ‘CHEMCO PLAST’ were being used by Chemco Plast.
- The reply of Chemco Plast dated 14 October 2015 to the cease and desist notice dated 19 September 2015 in which it has stated that since the year 2006 it was manufacturing and / or marketing a wide range of products under the trade mark ‘CHEMCO’, trade name ‘CHEMCO PLAST’, and domain name www.chemcoplast.com.
Considering the material on record, CPIPL has been able to prima facie demonstrate that Chemco Plast invaded, attempted to invade, and threatened to invade the registered trademark of CPIPL. Chemco Plast was restrained from using the marks ‘CHEMCO’ and ‘CHEMCO PLAST’ in relation to its goods including in its preforms, plastic bottles, caps, and other plastic packaging materials
In light of the presence of Chemco Plast in the market with the trade name ‘CHEMCO’ for nearly 25 years since 1999, it may not be justifiable to grant an injunction against Chemco Plast from using ‘CHEMCO’ as a trade name or part of the domain name.

The JSA team was led by Partner Farhad Sorabjee with support from Partner Pratik Pawar, Principal Associate Siddhesh Pradhan and Associate Meher Mistri.

Tags Bombay High Court, Brand Protection, Chemco, Commercial IP Suit, Court Ruling, India Legal, Injunction Order, Intellectual Property, IP Litigation, JSA, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, Legal Update, Trade Marks Act, Trademark Infringement

JSA successfully represented TaskUs India Private Limited before the Indore Commercial Court in Section 9 proceedings

A wooden judge’s gavel placed on a courtroom table with three professionals in suits discussing legal documents in the background.

JSA successfully represented TaskUs India Pvt. Ltd. in defending a Section 9 petition filed by Ensemble Infrastructure India Pvt. Ltd. before the Commercial Court, Indore. Ensemble sought wide interim measures, including stay of termination, injunction against engaging third-party vendors, and a direction to deposit a substantial amount-as alleged dues, arising from a turnkey design-and-build contract for TaskUs.

The Court dismissed the petition in its entirety, holding that the Master Purchase Agreement was a determinable contract, that termination was issued in accordance with the contract, and that no prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable harm was established in favour of Ensemble

The case involved complex allegations of delay, scope variations, and competing technical narratives, with Ensemble seeking intrusive reliefs that would effectively reverse termination and freeze TaskUs’s ongoing fit-out operations. JSA successfully demonstrated that the contractor’s delays were documented, that TaskUs had lawfully terminated the contract, and that work had already been substantially completed by a replacement vendor, rendering the requested reliefs infructuous and commercially disruptive. The Court accepted TaskUs’s position that Section 9 cannot be used to resurrect a determinable contract, and that detailed factual disputes must be resolved only in arbitration, not through interim injunctions.

The matter was led by Padmaja Kaul (Partner) with support from Kushagra Sah (Senior Associate) and Vansh Bhutani (Associate).

Tags Arbitration, CommercialCourt, DeterminableContract, DisputeAlert, DisputeResolution, Indore, JSA, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, Section9, TaskUs

JSA successfully represented Continuum before MPERC in securing an Order qua computation of RE short-term transmission charges on energy injected vis a vis levy on Open Access capacity.

In a relief for Continuum, a renewable energy (“RE”) generator, the Ld. Madhya Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (“Ld. MPERC”) has passed an Order holding that short-term transmission charges are to be paid on the basis of per unit of energy injected and not on the Open Access (“OA”) capacity sought.

The rationale behind the methodology for computation of transmission charges on the basis of units injected is that the ‘capacity utilisation factor’ of RE plants is low and imposing transmission charges on allocated capacity/Open Access quantity of such plants, will make them unreasonable / onerous.

Ld. MPERC’s findings are in line with the statutory mandate of the Electricity Act, 2003 which enjoins the Commission to promote consumption of electricity from RE sources.

The Commission’s Order paves the path for similarly placed RE generators/consumers qua appropriate levy of short-term transmission charges, thereby making the consumption of RE financially more viable.

JSA’s team comprised of Abhishek Munot (Lead Partner), along with Kunal Kaul (Partner), Tushar Nagar (Partner) and Purvi Shrivastava (Associate).

The matter was argued by Kunal Kaul (Partner).

Tags Abhishek Munot, Continuum, Electricity Act 2003, Energy Law, JSA, Kunal Kaul, MPERC, Open Access, RE Generator, Regulatory, Renewable Energy, Short Term Transmission Charges

JSA successfully represents PTC India Financial Services Ltd. (“PFS”) before the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in a batch of connected quashing petitions challenging summoning orders issued in complaints filed by PFS under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

JSA Advocates and Solicitors has successfully represented and defended PFS before the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in a batch of connected quashing petitions filed by NSL Energy Ventures Private Limited (“NEVPL”) and its Directors (collectively, “Accused Persons”) under Section 482 of the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023). These petitions were filed to challenge summoning orders issued in complaints filed by PFS under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“NI Act”) against the Accused Persons.

PFS had extended a bridge loan of INR 125 Crores (“Bridge Loan”) in favour of NSL Nagapatnam Power and Infratech Limited (“Principal Borrower”), for the purpose of setting up a 1320 MW coal based thermal power project in Odisha. This Bridge Loan was secured, inter alia, by certain post-dated cheques (“PDCs”) issued by NEVPL, being a related entity of the Principal Borrower, to ensure timely repayment.

Following the sanction of the Bridge Loan, the Principal Borrower started defaulting in its repayment obligations. In view of the continuing default, PFS presented the PDCs for encashment towards discharge of its legally enforceable debt. However, all the PDCs were returned dishonoured.

Consequently, PFS filed complaints under Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act (“Complaints”) before the Learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House Courts, Delhi (“Ld. Magistrate”), against the Accused Persons. In view of the Complaints, The Ld. Magistrate issued summoning orders against the Accused Persons.

Feeling aggrieved by the issuance of summoning orders, the Accused Persons filed multiple quashing petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) before the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi (“Delhi High Court”). PFS opposed the quashing petitions and asserted that the Complaints filed by it against the Accused Persons are maintainable.

After a detailed hearing and upon consideration of the entire material on record, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court, by a common Judgment dated 27 November 2025, dismissed the batch of connected quashing petitions, and upheld PFS’s right to proceed with the Complaints against the Accused Persons. The key findings made by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court are as follows:

The Court undertook a detailed examination of the roles and responsibilities of each Director to determine whether the summoning orders satisfied the statutory requirements under Section 141 of the NI Act. The Court reaffirmed that Section 141 creates a vicarious liability, extending criminal liability from the company to those individuals who, at the time of the offence, were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of its business. The Court relied on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 16 SCC 1; Chitalapati Srinivasa Raju v. SEBI, AIR 2018 SC 2411; and Kamal Kishor Shrigopal Taparia v. India Ener-gen Pvt Ltd, 2025 INSC 223.
The Court dismissed the quashing petitions filed by the Directors who were signatories to the impugned cheques and upheld the summoning orders against these accused persons. The Court, however, allowed the quashing petitions filed by one of the directors who was classified as a Non-Executive Director under Form DIR-12 and was not a signatory to the cheques.
The Accused Persons had also contended that certain payments were made in discharge of the loan, and that the Bridge Loan Agreement stood novated on account of certain communications between the parties on conversion of the Bridge Loan to a Term Loan. The Court rejected these contentions and held that (i) no essential elements of a new agreement were ever concluded as there was no offer by PFS, no acceptance by the borrower, and also no fresh consideration; (ii) payment of certain amounts was simply in discharge of existing arrears and could not signify novation; and (iii) since the original Bridge Loan Agreement remained fully in force, the post-dated security cheques continued to represent a valid and legally enforceable debt.
The Court accordingly upheld PFS’s right to proceed with its Complaints under Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act against the issuer and the signatory of the cheques.

The JSA Disputes Team was led by Partner Sidharth Sethi, with support from the team comprising Partner Shreya Sircar, Associate Kunal Saini, and Junior Associate Riya Singh.

The matter was argued by Mr. Siddharth Agarwal, Senior Advocate, instructed by JSA.

Matter value – INR 1,25,00,00,000/- (Indian Rupees One Hundred Twenty Five Crores only).

Judgment Date – 27 November 2025

Tags ChequeDishonour, DelhiHighCourt, Disputes, FinancialServices, JSA, Litigation, NIAct, NSLEnergyVentures, PFS, Section138, SidharthSethi, VicariousLiability

JSA obtains stay order for ManipalCigna Health Insurance Company Limited before the High Court of Delhi

Judge's gavel resting on a wooden table with a neutral background.

JSA is pleased to announce that we have successfully represented ManipalCigna Health Insurance Company Limited before the High Court of Delhi in securing a stay on the operation of an order directing the company to issue unconditional relieving and experience letters to an employee who had been terminated on grounds of misconduct.

The High Court passed the stay order in an appeal filed against the earlier decision of the Tis Hazari District Court, which had directed ManipalCigna to issue the relieving and experience letters. The stay order provides significant interim relief to the client, pending final adjudication of the dispute.

The matter was led by Partner, Padmaja Kaul, with assistance from Senior Associate, Kushagra Sah, and Associate, Vansh Bhutani.

JSA Brief | October 2025

This edition of the JSA Brief showcases JSA authored articles, updates & newsletters and achievements such as deals and events in all practice area over the preceding month (October 2025).

To read further details, click here or refer to the below document.

For more details, please contact [email protected]

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Tags Articles, Deal Making, Events, JSA, JSA Prism, Legal Updates, Newsletters, Publications, Recognitions

JSA Prism | Dispute Resolution | November 2025

Please click here to download the Prism as a PDF.

The Supreme Court of India reiterates that the arbitral awards cannot be revisited through indirect procedural routes

The Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) in the case of MMTC Limited vs. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Private Limited[1] dismissed the objections filed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) at the stage of enforcement of an arbitral award. The objection was filed to nullify the arbitral award on the ground of allegations of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty by a corporation’s own officials, allegedly rendering the award inexecutable.

The Supreme Court dismissed the objections on the ground of lack of prima facie case and emphasised on the limited scope of objections available for a plea of nullity under Section 47 of CPC. The Supreme Court’s ruling reinforces the principle that arbitral award’s finality cannot be disturbed through collateral challenges and underscores the long standing principle of limited judicial intervention and finality of awards.

Brief facts

M/s. MMTC Limited (“Appellant”) and M/s. Anglo-American Metallurgical Coal Private. Limited (“Respondent”) executed a Long-Term Agreement (“LTA”) dated March 7, 2007 for the purchase of coal. On September 24, 2012, Respondent invoked the arbitration clause under the LTA for damages on account of un-lifted quantity of coal contracted by the Appellant. The arbitral award dated May 12, 2014 (“Award”) was determined in favour of the Respondent, with a direction to the Appellant to pay USD 78,720,000 (US Dollars seventy-eight million seven hundred and twenty thousand) plus interest and costs for damages.
The Award was challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) before the single judge of the High Court of Delhi (“Delhi HC”) but the same was dismissed. Subsequently, the order passed by the single judge of the Delhi HC was challenged before the division bench of the Delhi HC under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act and the same was allowed on March 2, 2020, setting aside the order of the single judge and consequently, the Award. This order of the division bench of the Delhi HC was challenged in the Supreme Court and on December 17, 2020, the Supreme Court restored the Award and set aside the division bench’s order. Following a review and clarification, the award attained finality.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed the execution petition seeking enforcement of the Award. During the proceedings in the execution petition, the Appellant filed objections under Section 47 of the CPC before a single judge of the Delhi HC[2] alleging that its own senior officials had colluded with the Respondent to artificially inflate the contract price of the coal. It argued that the alleged fraud and breach of fiduciary duty was only discovered and investigated later and as such, could not have been brought into record during the earlier proceedings. Additionally, the Appellant referred to the ongoing investigations being conducted by Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”) as a ground to halt enforcement.
Further to the above, the Appellant also file a civil suit praying that the Award is void and unenforceable, on the contention that an award induced by fraud cannot be arbitrated. This suit was dismissed as being not maintainable and a Regular First Appeal[3] was filed and pending.
The Delhi HC dismissed these objections, holding that the scope of Section 47 of the CPC is limited to jurisdictional defects and cannot be invoked to reopen settled arbitral findings. The Delhi HC further observed that entertaining objections under Section 47 of the CPC during the enforcement proceedings would expose the Award to a second round of litigation, thus frustrating the legislative intent of finality and efficiency under the Arbitration Act.Hence, the Appellant filed the present appeal.

Issues

Whether MMTC’s objections under Section 47 of CPC, alleging fraud and breach of fiduciary duty by its own officials, rendered the arbitral award inexecutable?
Whether post-award allegations of fraud justify judicial intervention at the stage of execution, in the absence of such contentions at arbitral or appellate stages?

Findings and analysis

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the findings of the Delhi HC that objections to enforcement under Section 47 of CPC are confined to jurisdictional infirmities and decrees that are absolute nullities, errors of fact or law do not suffice. While observing that the objections in the present case is not on the ground of any inherent lack of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court underscored that objections at the execution stage form a ‘very narrow compass’, upholding the intent of the Arbitration Act to restrict judicial intervention post-finality. However, in light of the facts of the present matter, the Supreme Cout was not convinced to dismiss the objections only on maintainability and hence, analysed merits.
The Supreme Court briefly discussed the legal parameters involving breach of fiduciary duty including the test of a ‘Reasonably Competent Director’, ‘Range of Reasonableness’ and the ‘Business Judgment Rule’ and reviewed the facts of the case. The Supreme Court cautioned against the dangers of hindsight bias when reviewing corporate decision-making and held that courts must defer to board actions taken within a reasonable range of options. Additionally, it held that adjudication authorities must assess whether the challenged conduct was so irrational or reckless that no reasonable company director (in similar circumstances) could have adopted it. Only decisions palpably outside this spectrum may attract judicial censure.
Applying the ‘Business Judgment Rule’, the Supreme Court observed that based on the materials furnished, the directors of the Appellant acted in a manner that a reasonable personnel / director of any company would. It further observed that the First Information Report (“FIR”) filed in this regard, which triggered the investigations by CBI was only a legal process set in motion. It does not in itself prove the allegations of fraud or render the Award inexecutable. Hence, the Supreme Court held that the Appellant failed to establish a prima facie The judgment robustly upholds the principle of finality in arbitral awards, warning against collateral challenges via new proceedings or criminal complaints after the award and appellate judgments have attained closure. The Supreme Court noted that the pendency of criminal investigations, like those initiated by the CBI and pending FIRs, does not and should not impede award enforcement.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court clarified that the scope and applicability of Section 47 of CPC is limited and should be exercised sparingly at the stage of enforcement of an arbitral award. Additionally, it settled law on the objections under Section 47 of CPC, which is to be exercised only when the decree suffers from fundamental jurisdictional defects or a legal nullity. It cannot be used to challenge the errors of fact or law, or revisit issues already adjudicated during the original proceedings and subsequent appeals. This verdict reaffirmed the principle of finality in arbitral proceedings and reinforced India’s pro-enforcement stance, ensuring that collateral litigation cannot be used to derail settled arbitral outcomes.

This Prism is prepared by:

Harshavardhan Abburi
Partner

Poojitha Babbepalli
Principal Associate

Pooja Gandhi
Associate

For more details, please contact [email protected].

[1] Civil Appeal No. 13321 of 2025 @ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 14832 of 2025 (decided on November 3, 2025)

[2] OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) No. 19 of 2018.

[3] RFA (OS) (Comm) No. 28 of 2025

Tags #RegulatoryUpdates, ArbitralAward, Arbitration, ArbitrationEnforcement, CPC, DisputeResolution, IndiaLaw, JSA, JudicialReview, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, LegalUpdate, SupremeCourt

JSA Prism | Dispute Resolution | November 2025

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Supreme Court of India reinforces the prohibition on second Special Leave Petition following unconditional withdrawal: A decision grounded in public policy against repetitive litigation

A Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”), in the case of Satheesh V.K. vs. The Federal Bank Limited[1], dismissed 2 (two) civil appeals filed by a borrower challenging the maintainability of a second round of litigation before the Supreme Court after having unconditionally withdrawn an earlier Special Leave Petition (“SLP”). The Supreme Court, while reiterating the principle of finality in litigation, held that such repeated attempts to challenge the same order are impermissible and contrary to public policy.