New Filters: Dispute Resolution and Arbitration

If you are not happy with the results, please do another search

Supreme Court Stays Levy of Grid Support Charges on Captive Power Plants for FY 2025-26

JSA successfully represented Rain Cements Limited before the Supreme Court and secured an interim order dated May 22, 2025, staying the levy of Grid Support Charges on Captive Power Plants (CPPs) for the financial year 2025–26. This provides interim relief to CPPs in the state of Andhra Pradesh, which were burdened by the imposition of such charges.

By an order dated February 20, 2025, the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (APERC) had permitted the distribution licensees of Andhra Pradesh (AP Discoms) to levy Grid Support Charges on CPPs for FY 2025–26. This order was challenged before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL). However, by its judgment dated May 13, 2025, APTEL dismissed the appeal. A Civil Appeal was thereafter filed before the Supreme Court.

At the first hearing on May 22, 2025, the Supreme Court noted a prima facie illegality in the levy of Grid Support Charges on CPPs in Andhra Pradesh and accordingly directed that the levy be stayed, subject to the appellant depositing 50% of the claimed amount.

Notably, in earlier civil appeals filed by JSA on behalf of Sarda Metals & Alloys Ltd., the Supreme Court had also granted similar stay orders on October 21, 2024, and November 11, 2024, in relation to the levy of Grid Support Charges for the financial years 2022–23 and 2023–24.

This marks a paradigm shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to the issue of Grid Support Charges on CPPs. In previous cases involving similar levies by other states—such as Madhya Pradesh—the Supreme Court did not provide any interim relief.

Therefore, the interim order dated May 22, 2025, for the FY 2025–26 levy, along with the earlier orders dated October 21, 2024, and November 11, 2024, for FY 2022–23 and FY 2023–24 respectively, constitute a welcome, albeit temporary, relief for CPPs that were otherwise required to pay the entire amount of the charges. This development is also likely to assist other similarly placed CPPs across the sector.

Mr. P. Chidambaram, Senior Advocate, led the arguments, supported by Ms. Poonam Verma Sengupta (Lead Partner), Mr. Saunak Kumar Rajguru (Principal Associate), and Ms. Devisi Bhuwalka (Junior Associate) on behalf of Rain Cements.

The JSA disputes team comprised Lead Partner Poonam Verma Sengupta, Principal Associate Saunak Kumar Rajguru, and Junior Associate Devisi Bhuwalka.

Tags Captive Power Plants, Electricity Law, Grid Support Charges, Interim Relief, JSA deal, JSA Deal Alert, JSA Disputes, Legal Victory, Power Sector, Regulatory Update, Supreme Court of India

JSA Brief | April 2025

This edition of the JSA Brief showcases JSA authored articles, updates & newsletters and achievements such as deals and events in all practice area over the preceding month (April 2025).

To read further details, click here or refer to the below document.

For more details, please contact [email protected]

*In case the document is not visible on the device you are using, please click the link above.

Tags Articles, Deal Making, Events, JSA, JSA Prism, Legal Updates, Newsletters, Publications, Recognitions

Farid Karachiwala | Emerging Trends in Real Estate Investment

Watch the insightful discussion on the evolving landscape of real estate investment in India. Our Partner and Co-Chair of the Disputes Practice, Farid Karachiwala, engages in a compelling conversation with Ali Lokhandwala, Managing Director of Lokhandwala Infrastructure, exploring the next phase of property investment opportunities and challenges in the region.

In this exclusive video, filmed on the sidelines of the JSA Mint India Investment Summit, Farid and Ali dissect the key trends that are set to shape the future of real estate investment in India. Their expert analysis provides valuable perspectives for industry professionals keen on understanding market dynamics and strategic investment approaches.

Watch this enlightening exchange and gain a deeper understanding of India’s property market trajectory.

Tags Emerging Trends, JSA, JSA Events, JSA Mint IIS 2025, JSA Thought Leadership, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, Lokhandwala Infrastructure, Mint India Investment Summit, Property Investment, Real Estate India

JSA Prism | Dispute Resolution | May 2025

Please click here to download the document.

Delhi High Court holds that truthful and scientifically backed content shared in good faith by social media influencers is not defamation or disparagement

A single judge of the Delhi High Court (“Delhi HC”) in San Nutrition Private Limited vs. Arpit Mangal and Ors.[1], while rejecting grant of an interim injunction, has held that influencers are not liable for defamation or disparagement when the information shared by them is true, not misleading and without malicious intent.

Brief facts

Arpit Mangal (“Defendant No. 1”), a social media influencer, published videos on the YouTube platform inter alia reviewing DC Doctor’s Choice Iso Pro (“Product”) marketed by San Nutrition Private Limited (“Plaintiff”). Defendant No. 1’s videos on the Product were based on independent laboratory reports (“Lab Reports”) and comparison with other competitor products in the market. Relying solely upon Defendant No. 1’s videos, Kabir Grover (“Defendant No. 2”) and Manish Keswani (“Defendant No. 3”) posted similar videos on YouTube. Avijit Roy (“Defendant No. 4”) also published videos on the Product after self-testing it with a kit developed by a competitor brand and used Plaintiff’s mark in the thumbnail of the videos.

Being aggrieved by these videos published by Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 (“Impugned Videos”) which showed the Plaintiff and the Product in negative light, the Plaintiff filed a suit along with an interim injunction application. While Defendant No. 1 appeared and opposed the interim injunction application, Defendant Nos. 2 to 4 did not appear before the Delhi HC.

In the interim injunction application, the Plaintiff inter alia contended that: (a) the Impugned Videos contained false, malicious and misleading statements about the Plaintiff and the Product with an attempt to defame and disparage; (b) the damage caused to the Plaintiff was visible from the negative comments/reviews on the Impugned Videos, e-commerce websites along with the decline in the sales of the Product; and (c) the Impugned Videos contain the name/pictures/videos of the Product and also shows the Plaintiff’s mark which amounts to unauthorised and wrongful use of Plaintiff’s trademark and copyright.

Defendant No. 1 inter alia contended that the statements made in his videos were: (a) fair comments issued in public interest, based on scientific evidence, and were protected under the right to exercise freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India (“Constitution”); and (b) based on truth substantiated by verifiable Lab Reports accredited under applicable laws. Defendant No. 1 also contended that the use of Plaintiff’s marks in his videos was covered under fair use and does not violate the Plaintiff’s intellectual property rights.

Issue

Whether the Impugned Videos were defamatory, disparaging and infringed upon the Plaintiff’s trademarks?

Findings and Analysis

The Delhi HC rejected the Plaintiff’s interim application and inter alia observed as follows:

in cases of defamation, the defence of truth or justification has been recognised as a complete defence and the onus of proving the truth of the statement is on the defendant.[2] The defence of truth cannot be defeated solely on account of malice;[3]
the defence of fair comment applies if the defendant establishes that: (a) he believed the statements to be correct based on the facts available to him; and (b) there was no malice behind the statements. The onus of proving malice in such cases lies on the plaintiff;[4]
commercial speech is protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. However, if such speech is deceptive, unfair, misleading or untruthful, it would be restricted under Article 19(2) of the Constitution.[5] Further, commercial speech would amount to disparagement if the 3 (three) fold test of falsehood, malicious intent and special damage is established by the plaintiff;[6] and
as upheld by the Supreme Court of India, the threshold for grant of interim injunctions in cases of defamation and disparagement is based on the Bonnard principle.[7] As per the Bonnard principle, interim injunctions in cases of defamation and disparagement should not be granted unless the defence set up by the defendant is eventually bound to fail in trial; and
for any case on infringement under Section 29A of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, a defendant would have to use the plaintiff’s registered trademark in the course of his trade or commercially exploit the same.[8]

Based on the above principles and in the facts of the case, the Hon’ble Delhi HC prima facie held that the Plaintiff had failed to discharge its burden of proof in establishing that the statements made in the Impugned Videos were palpably false, misleading, malicious and/or were bound to fail at the stage of trial. Further, the Delhi HC also ruled that the Plaintiff had failed to establish a case for infringement of its intellectual property rights. Accordingly, the Delhi HC held that Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 were entitled to protection of free speech under the Constitution.

Conclusion

This decision highlights the need to strike a careful balance between protecting the right to freedom of speech and expression of social media influencers and preserving the reputation of businesses in an increasingly digital landscape. It underscores the importance of fostering a harmonious coexistence between individual expression and corporate honesty in the era of social media. Notably, the ruling gains further significance as it deals with circumstances for grant of an interim injunction, a form of immediate relief that businesses often seek when facing potential defamation or brand disparagement.

This Prism is prepared by:

Farhad Sorabjee
Partner

Pratik Pawar
Partner

Shanaya Cyrus Irani
Partner

Sanjana Pandey
Associate

For more details, please contact [email protected]

[1] 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2701

[2] Pankaj Oswal vs. Vikas Pahwa, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1193

[3] 2006 SCC OnLine Del 14

[4] Tata Sons vs. Greenpeace, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 466

[5] Tata Press vs. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited, (1995) 5 SCC 139,

[6] Dabur India vs. Colortek Meghalaya, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3940

[7] Bloomberg Television vs. Zee Entertainment, (2025) 1 Supreme Court Cases 741; Bonnard vs. Perryman, [1891] 95 All ER 965.

[8] Tata Sons vs. Greenpeace, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 466

Tags Defamation Law, Delhi High Court, Digital Speech, Freedom Of Expression, India Legal Update, Influencer Marketing, Interim Injunction, JSA, Judicial Update, Online Reputation, Social Media Law

JSA Prism | Dispute Resolution | May 2025

Please click here to download the document.

The Supreme Court of India upholds the constitutional validity of the pecuniary jurisdiction of consumer commissions established under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 basis the value of goods or services paid as consideration

The Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) has in Rutu Mihir Panchal and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.[1] held that the determination of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District, State, and National Consumer Commissions (“Consumer Commissions”) based on the consideration paid for the purchase of goods and services under Sections 34 (1), 47 (1)(a)(i) and 58 (1)(a)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (“2019 Act”) (“Provisions”) is constitutional and not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India (“Constitution”).

Brief facts

This judgement deals with questions of law arising out of – (a) Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution (“Writ Petition”)[2]; and (b) Civil Appeal[3] challenging an order passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (“NCDRC”) (“Civil Appeal”). The facts of each case are as follows:

Writ Petition

The husband of Rutu Mihir Panchal (“Petitioner”) purchased a Ford Endeavour (“Vehicle”) from an authorised dealer of Ford India Private Limited for INR 31,19,000 (Indian Rupees thirty-one lakh nineteen thousand). On November 20, 2018, the Vehicle caught fire, leading to the death of the Petitioner’s husband. The Petitioner filed a consumer complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (“DCDRC”), Vadodara seeking compensation of INR 51,49,00,000 (Indian Rupees fifty-one crore forty-nine lakh) along with interest. Pending the disposal of the complaint, the Petitioner filed the Writ Petition seeking that the Provisions be declared unconstitutional. This was on the basis that the Petitioner was compelled to approach the DCDRC, Vadodara because of the statutory regime under the 2019 Act, i.e., the pecuniary jurisdiction being determined according to the value of the goods or services paid as consideration. It was alleged that the Petitioner could have directly approached the NCDRC under the repealed Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (“1986 Act”) where the pecuniary jurisdiction was based on the compensation claimed.

Civil Appeal

The husband of Gurjeet Kaur Saini (“Appellant”) passed away due to COVID-19. When the Appellant’s claim based on an insurance policy offered by Lions International Club was denied, she filed a consumer complaint before the NCDRC seeking compensation of INR 14,94,00,000 (Indian Rupees fourteen crore ninety-four lakh). The NCDRC rejected the Appellant’s complaint on the ground that the consideration for the insurance policy did not exceed INR 10,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees ten crore) and thus, the NCDRC did not have pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.

Before the Supreme Court, the Petitioner/Appellant contended that: (a) the 2019 Act replaced the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Commissions from the value of compensation claimed under the 1986 Act to the value of consideration paid, which is unconstitutional; (b) the present statutory regime gives rise to an anomalous situation wherein a consumer claiming a large compensation for a lower consideration would be relegated to the district or state commissions whereas a consumer seeking a lower compensation may be entitled to approach the NCDRC even in the event of a higher consideration paid; (c) the new criterion for determining pecuniary jurisdiction is discriminatory since consumers that claim identical compensation but have paid different considerations are treated differently; (d) given that the definition of a ‘consumer’ under the 2019 Act does not discriminate on the basis of consideration paid, the restriction of access to judicial remedies on the basis of consideration paid is illegal and arbitrary; and (e) there is no rational for introducing a new criterion for determining the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Commissions.

The respondents inter alia contended that the: (a) pecuniary classifications created on the basis of value of goods and services paid as consideration has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, i.e., timely settlement of consumer disputes; and (b) the Provisions are not manifestly arbitrary and were introduced to prevent exaggerated claims.

Issue

Whether empowering the Consumer Commissions to exercise jurisdiction based on the value of the goods or services paid as consideration is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution?

Findings and analysis

The Supreme Court held that the Provisions of the 2019 Act are constitutional for the following reasons:

the Parliament has the legislative competence and power to prescribe limits of pecuniary jurisdiction of courts and tribunals, including the district, state, and national commission;
the test for determining whether a provision of law is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution is founded on 2 (two) principles[4]: (a) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others; and (b) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute has been satisfied; and
the classification of pecuniary jurisdiction based on value of goods and services on the basis of the amount paid as consideration is valid and has a direct rational nexus to the object of creating a hierarchical structure of judicial remedies.

Apart from upholding the validity of the Provisions, the Supreme Court directed the Central Consumer Protection Council and the Central Consumer Protection Authority to take such measures as may be necessary for survey and review and advise the government about necessary measures for the effective and efficient working of the 2019 Act.

Conclusion

The classifications set forth in the Provisions (which have been further revised by the Consumer Protection (Jurisdiction of the District Commission, the State Commission and the National Commission) Rules, 2021) prescribe a reasonable and rationale determination of the pecuniary jurisdiction of consumer courts. These Provisions prevent consumers from approaching Consumer Commissions solely on the basis of self-assessed claims for damages.

This Prism has been prepared by:

Farhad Sorabjee
Partner

Pratik Pawar
Partner

Shanaya Cyrus Irani
Partner

Siddhesh Pradhan
Principal Associate

Meher Mistri
Associate

Jatin Asrani
Junior Associate

For more details, please contact [email protected].

[1] 2025 SCC OnLine SC 974

[2] Writ Petition (Civil) No. 282 of 2021

[3] Civil Appeal No. 5670 of 2025 arising out of SLP (C) No. 1738 of 2022

[4] State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) 1 SCC 1

Tags Access To Justice, Consumer Law, Consumer Protection Act 2019, India Law Update, JSA, Judicial Update, Legal Clarity, Pecuniary Jurisdiction, Regulatory Reform, SC Judgment, Supreme Court

JSA Prism | Dispute Resolution | May 2025

Please click here to download the document.

Supreme Court clarifies scope of modification of arbitral awards under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

On April 30, 2025, a 5 (five) judge constitution bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) in Gayatri Balasamy vs. M/s. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited[1] held that the courts possess a limited power to modify arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”). The Supreme Court further clarified that this power is not absolute and may only be exercised in specific circumstances, such as when the arbitral award is severable, to correct clerical or computational errors, or to modify post-award interest. However, the Supreme Court stated that such power is always subject to the express statutory framework and legislative intent and cautioned that it may not be exercised to rewrite the award or to conduct a merits-based evaluation.

Brief facts

In the present case , the Supreme Court referred a pivotal legal question to a 5 (five) judge constitution bench viz. whether courts possess the authority to modify arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act. The brief facts leading to the lead reference are as follows:

Gayatri Balasamy (“Appellant”) joined ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited (“Respondent”) as Vice President (M&A Integration Strategy) in April 2006. Just a few months into her tenure, she resigned in July 2006, alleging sexual harassment by the Respondent’s CEO, Krishna Srinivasan. The Appellant’s resignation was not accepted, and over the following year, the Respondent issued 3 (three) termination letters to the Appellant.
In response, the Appellant filed criminal complaints against the CEO of the Respondent and another company executive. The Respondent countered with criminal complaints of defamation and extortion against the Appellant. The dispute escalated and was eventually referred by the Supreme Court to arbitration.
The arbitral tribunal awarded the Appellant INR 2,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees two crore) as compensation, but the Respondent challenged the arbitral award before the Hon’ble Madras High Court (“Madras HC”). It was the case of the Appellant before the Madras HC that several of the Appellant’s claims were not considered.
In 2014, a single-judge bench of the Madras HC modified the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and granted an additional compensation of INR 1,60,00,000 (Indian Rupees one crore sixty lakh).
However, in 2019, the Division Bench of the Madras HC acting under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act reduced this additional amount and modified it to INR 50,000 (Indian Rupees fifty thousand), finding the earlier increase excessive.
Dissatisfied by the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras HC, the Appellant appealed the same before the Supreme Court via a special leave petition. The Supreme Court recognised that the Appellant’s case raised a significant legal issue and was referred to a larger bench due to conflicting judicial opinions by the Supreme Court in the past. Accordingly, the appeal was referred to a 5 (five) judge bench to clarify the legal position on the court’s power to modify arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act.

Key issue

Are Indian courts jurisdictionally empowered to modify an arbitral award under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act? If so, to what extent?

Legal provision

Section 34 of the Arbitration Act reads as follows:

Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).
An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if—
- the party making the application establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal that—
  - a party was under some incapacity, or
  - the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or
  - the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
  - the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration:
    Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or

- - the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or
- the Court finds that—
  - the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or
  - the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India.
    (2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award:
    Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.
    …”. [explanations omitted]

Analysis and findings

By a majority of 4:1, the Supreme Court held that courts have a limited power to modify awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act. The decision was centred around the following issues:

severability of arbitral awards;
hardship of parties;
correction of clerical or typographical errors;
variation of interest; and
exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution for modification of awards.

The findings rendered by the majority judgment and the minority judgment regarding each of these issues are summarised below:

Issue	Majority view “The limited power under Section 34 allows the court to vary or modify the award”	Minority view “…what is sought to be done is virtual mutilation of the fabric and not just the ironing out of the creases”
Severability [concurrence]	Authority to sever the invalid portion of the award from the valid portion is inherent in the jurisdiction to set aside an award. Modification and setting aside have different consequences – one is alteration, the other is annulment.	The consistent view has been that if claims falling foul of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act are not inseparably intertwined with the good portion of the award, the award can be severed. The power to set aside will include the power to partially set aside.
Hardship of parties [dissent]	Denying courts the power to modify awards would impose significant hardship, escalate costs and lead to unnecessary delays. This would defeat the objective of arbitration as parties would be compelled to undergo extra rounds of arbitration, in addition to the stages of challenge under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act and special leave petition.	Recommencement of proceedings being expressly contemplated in the statute, the same cannot be brushed aside on the grounds of hardship of parties. When parties agree to arbitrate, they consciously agree with open eyes to step out of the normal judicial process and submit to being governed by the Arbitration Act.
Errors [concurrence]	Courts under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act possess the authority to rectify computational, clerical or typographical errors “as well as other manifest errors, provided that such modification does not necessitate a merits-based evaluation”. Court must have no uncertainty or doubt in this regard – if the error is not apparent on the face of the record, the court cannot modify.	Courts under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act can invoke the power to correct computational errors, clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of similar nature “without modifying, altering or adding to the original award” – hence, a limited exception to M Hakeem’s judgement[2] is made.
Interest [dissent]	For pendente lite interest, court may set aside the award of interest or remand the matter to the arbitrators. For post-award interest, courts will retain the power to modify the interest rate. Courts may increase or decrease the post-award interest, but only where there are compelling and well-founded reasons to do so.	Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act cannot modify the interest. The correct course would be to remit the matter to the arbitrator to make course correction. If the matter comes to court again and the grounds for setting aside are still present, there would be no choice but to set aside the award.
Article 142 of the Constitution [dissent]	This power should not be exercised where the effect would be to rewrite or modify the award on merits. However, the power can be exercised where required and necessary to bring the dispute to an end.	This power cannot be used to supplant substantive law, as express statutory provisions cannot be ignored and what cannot be achieved directly cannot be achieved indirectly. The power cannot be exercised as it will derogate from the core aspects of the Arbitration Act and breach a pre-eminent prohibition in the Arbitration Act.

Conclusion

The majority view of the Supreme Court affirms that Indian courts possess a limited power to modify arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act. This power is not absolute but is confined to specific circumstances, such as when the arbitral award is severable, to correct clerical or computational errors, or to adjust post-award interest rates that are unreasonable or conflict with statutory or contractual benchmarks. The Supreme Court made it clear that such modifications do not entail a review on merits, thereby preserving the sanctity and finality of arbitral awards, except in cases where statutory grounds for intervention exist.
The majority emphasised that the statutory framework under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act restricts judicial intervention to procedural irregularities, jurisdictional errors, and public policy violations, and does not permit a wholesale merits review of the arbitral tribunal’s findings. The Supreme Court distinguished between setting aside and modification, stating that while setting aside annuls the award, modification is a narrower power exercised only to correct apparent and severable errors. This approach seeks to strike a balance between upholding arbitral autonomy and ensuring that manifest errors do not go unaddressed.
Importantly, the Supreme Court clarified that remand to the arbitral tribunal under Section 34(4) of the Arbitration Act is discretionary and should be reserved for curable defects, such as gaps in reasoning. Direct modification by the court is permissible only for non-substantive corrections, such as computational slips, to avoid unnecessary delays and procedural complications. The Supreme Court also recognised the uniform application of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act across all arbitrations, refusing to carve out exceptions for statutory arbitrations unless expressly provided by legislation.
Further, the majority view of the Supreme Court held that under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court is empowered to ‘do complete justice’ in any case. However, the minority view noted that this extraordinary power must be exercised sparingly and in harmony with the statutory scheme of the Arbitration Act. Article 142 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to override explicit legislative intent or to rewrite arbitral awards on merits, thus ensuring that the principle of party autonomy and the limited role of courts in arbitration are respected. The Supreme Court’s nuanced approach preserves the integrity of the arbitral process while allowing to correct clear and severable errors, reinforcing both judicial restraint and ‘complete justice’.

This Prism is prepared by:

Varghese Thomas
Partner

Divyam Agarwal
Partner

Fatema Kachwalla
Partner

Aniket Aggarwal
Senior Associate

Virgil Braganza
Senior Associate

For more details, please contact [email protected]

[1] Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 15336 of 2021

[2] Project Director, National Highways No. 45 E and 220 National Highways Authority of India Vs. M. Hakeem and Anr., (2021) 9 SCC 1

Tags Delhi HC, Delhi High Court, Dispute Resolution, Disputes, JSA, JSA Prism, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyer, Leading Lawyers, Legal Updates, Newsletter

Divyam Agarwal | On Powers of Court to Modify Arbitral Awards

Our Partner, Divyam Agarwal, recently participated in a distinguished panel discussion on the television programme “Legally Speaking with Tarun Nangia.” The topic of this insightful discussion was “On Powers of Court to Modify Arbitral Awards,” an area of significant relevance and interest within the legal community in the wake of Constitution Bench decision in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. This episode was broadcast on NewsX and is now available for viewing online.

Divyam was honoured to share the panel with:

Mr. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Former Judge, Supreme Court of India
Mr. Arvind Varma, Senior Advocate
Dr. Sanjeev Gemawat, Group General Counsel, Essar Group
Mr. Kartik Seth, Advocate

Mr. Tarun Nangia moderated the panel.

We invite you to watch this engaging discussion through the link provided below, where you will gain valuable insights into the nuances of arbitral awards and court powers.

Tags Arbitral Awards, Arbitration Law, Arvind Varma, Dispute Resolution, Divyam Agarwal, India Legal Community, JSA Thought Leadership, Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Kartik Seth, Legal Insights, Legal Panel, Legally Speaking, NewsX, Powers of Court, Sajeev Gemawat, Tarun Nangia

JSA successfully represented its client before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court for suspension of the Look Out Circular issued by Serious Fraud Investigation Office and obtained interim relief to travel abroad

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court (“High Court”) vide its order dated April 29, 2025, granted interim relief to its client, who filed a Writ Petition challenging a Look Out Circular (“LOC”) barring him from leaving India. The LOC was issued at the behest of the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (“SFIO”) in connection with an ongoing investigation into the affairs of IL&FS. Earlier, JSA succeeded in securing permission for the client to travel overseas for two months, with the LOC suspended during that period, subject to compliance with conditions imposed by the High Court. In the subsequent application, the client sought a suspension of the LOC for 6 months to enable travel abroad for both business and personal reasons.

The SFIO, through its counsel, confirmed that the applicant had complied with the previous conditions imposed by the Court. Accordingly, the High Court, comprising of Hon’ble Ms. Justice R. M. Dere and Hon’ble Dr. Justice N. K. Gokhale, allowed the interim application on the following terms:

The LOC against the client stands suspended for six months, to facilitate overseas travel.
For every overseas trip during this duration, the client must furnish a full itinerary, including addresses and contact details, to SFIO at least 48 hours prior to departure, via electronic means and inform SFIO within 48 hours of returning to India after each trip.
The Immigration Authorities at all departure points are directed to permit the client to travel, even if their systems have not yet been updated, and regardless of whether SFIO has separately informed immigration.

Our disputes team comprised Lead Partner, Varghese Thomas, Partner, Hormuz Mehta and Senior Associate, Virgil Braganza.

Tags Bombay High Court, Client Representation, Court Ruling, High Court Order, ILFS, India Litigation, Interim Relief, JSA Dispute Alert, Legal Advisory, Legal Victory, LOC Suspension, Look Out Circular, Overseas Travel, SFIO, White Collar Investigation, Writ Petition

JSA successfully defends UltraTech Cement Limited before the High Court of Karnataka in seeking stay on disconnection of electricity supply on the pretext of recovery of alleged electricity dues

JSA successfully defended UltraTech Cement Limited (“UltraTech”) before the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court against the Distribution Licensee’s Writ Appeal, in effect, securing stay on recovery of alleged electricity dues and disconnection of electricity supply by the Distribution Licensee.

The dispute emanated because, after 18 years of the operation of UltraTech’s Bulk Terminal (cement packing unit) as an ‘Industrial’ Unit, Mangalore Electricity Supply Company Limited (“MESCOM”) i.e., the Distribution Licensee, issued a Demand Notice alleging ‘Commercial Use’ and demanded UltraTech to pay the differential of ‘Commercial’ and ‘Industrial’ tariff retrospectively. In absence of such payment, MESCOM threatened to disconnect electricity supply at UltraTech’s Bulk Terminal.

UltraTech filed a Writ Petition before the Ld. Single Judge, Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka seeking the Demand Notice to be quashed. JSA represented UltraTech. UltraTech inter alia contended that all along UltraTech’s Bulk Terminal was billed under ‘Industrial’ tariff category, there being NO change in circumstances, it was not open for MESCOM to unilaterally and retrospectively raise a demand for the differential of ‘Commercial’ and ‘Industrial’ tariff from UltraTech. Alongside highlighting the fact that Bulk Terminal has NOT been specifically categorized under any particular tariff category by the Karnataka Electricity Regulatory Commission, UltraTech also highlighted the Disconnection Notice is time barred in view of Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003.

By Order dated 08.08.2024, Ld. Single Judge, Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka passed a favourable interlocutory order in favour of UltraTech, directing MESCOM not to take any coercive action against UltraTech either qua the Demand Notice (i.e., recovery of the differential of ‘Commercial’ and ‘Industrial’ tariff) or Disconnection Notice.

Aggrieved by Order dated 08.08.2024 passed by the Ld. Single Judge, Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka, MESCOM filed a Writ Appeal before the Ld. Division Bench, Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka. JSA represented UltraTech and successfully defended UltraTech.

By Judgment dated 04.04.2025, Ld. Division Bench, Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka dismissed MESCOM’s Writ Appeal and did NOT interfere the interlocutory order passed in UltraTech’s favour by Ld. Single Judge, Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka. By virtue of this Judgment, the direction to MESCOM not to take any coercive action against UltraTech either qua the Demand Notice (i.e., recovery of the differential of ‘Commercial’ and ‘Industrial’ tariff) or Disconnection Notice remains intact.

The interlocutory order by the Ld. Single Judge, as upheld by the Division Bench provides necessary relief to UltraTech, an industrial consumer, alongside keeping in check the whimsical unilateral and arbitrary decision making by Distribution Licensee (here MESCOM).

Our disputes team comprised Lead Partner Poonam Verma Sengupta, Partner, Prasanth V.G., Principal Associate, Saunak Kumar Rajguru and Associate, Pradyumn Amit Sharma.

Tags Dispute Resolution, Electricity Act, Electricity Law, High Court Victory, Industrial Tariff, JSA deal, Karnataka High Court, Legal Update, Legal Victory, Power Sector, Tariff Dispute, Ultratech Cement, Writ Appeal Dismissed

JSA Brief | March 2025

This edition of the JSA Brief showcases JSA authored articles, updates & newsletters and achievements such as deals and events in all practice area over the preceding month (March 2025).

To read further details, click here or refer to the below document.

For more details, please contact [email protected]

*In case the document is not visible on the device you are using, please click the link above.

Tags Articles, Deal Making, Events, JSA, JSA Prism, Legal Updates, Newsletters, Publications, Recognitions

New Filters: Dispute Resolution and Arbitration

Delhi High Court holds that truthful and scientifically backed content shared in good faith by social media influencers is not defamation or disparagement

The Supreme Court of India upholds the constitutional validity of the pecuniary jurisdiction of consumer commissions established under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 basis the value of goods or services paid as consideration

Brief facts

Issue

Findings and analysis

Conclusion

Supreme Court clarifies scope of modification of arbitral awards under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Deals & Matter Corner

Articles & Publications

JSA Live

Blogs

Disclaimer & Confirmation