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Allahabad High Court upholds YEIDA’s cancellation of 1000-Hectare land allotment for JAL’s Sports City.

JSA successfully advised and represented Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (“YEIDA”) in proceedings before the Hon’ble High Court ofAllahabad (“High Court”) in a writ petition filed by M/s Jai Prakash Associates (“JAL”) for challenging the cancellation of allotment and lease deeds for the Sports CityProject (“Project”) comprising of 1000 Hectares in Gautam Buddha Nagar.

YEIDA had allotted the Project to JAL in 2010 for development of commercial, institutional, and residential areas with focus on sports. However, JAL failed to comply with its contractual obligations, defaulted in payments running into ~ INR 3000 crores, and failed to develop the land. Considering these factors as well as various grievances raised by the homebuyers, YEIDA eventually cancelled the allotment. JAL argued that the cancellation was excessive, unduly harsh and disproportionate.

The High Court upheld the validity and proportionality of YEIDA’s decision to cancel the entire allotment due to defaults in payment by JAL, despite JAL’s on-going insolvency resolution process. The High Court also issued detailed guidelines foraddressing the homebuyers’ concerns and ensuring the overall viability of the Project. The case presented several unique and complex aspects such as the contractual rights of a statutory authority, harmonious interpretation of various documents forming part of a single transaction, and balancing rights of multiple stakeholders (homebuyers, sub-lessees, banks and their mortgage rights) in a large-scale real estate project.

The dispute team was led by Partner, Amar Gupta and Divyam Agarwal with support from Senior Associate, Pranav Tanwar.

Tags Allahabad High Court, Highway, JSA, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, Legal Updates, Real Estate

Lending and Taking Security in India: Overview

A Q&A guide to lending and taking security in India.

This Q&A provides a high-level overview of forms of security over assets, release of security over assets, special purpose vehicles in secured lending, quasi-security, guarantees, risk areas for lenders, structuring the priority of debts, debt trading and transfer mechanisms, agent and trust concepts, enforcement of security interests, borrower insolvency and cross-border issues on loans.

Please click here to read the full article by Partners – Divyanshu Pandey and Soumitra Majumdar and Associate – Ramkrishna Panigrahi published in Thomson Reuters Practical Law.

Tags Finance, JSA, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, Legal Updates, Real Estate

JSA Prism | Real Estate | February 2025

Please click here to download the Prism as a PDF.

Agreement to sell granting possession of immovable property must be treated as a conveyance for stamp duty purposes

Recently the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”), while deciding the case of Mr. Ramesh Mishrimal Jain vs. Mr. Avinash Vishwanath Patne and Niranjan Prakash Dali,[1] held that an agreement to sell granting possession of property would be deemed to be a conveyance and would attract stamp duty as applicable to a conveyance under Explanation I to Article 25 (“the Explanation”) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 (“Maharashtra Stamp Act”).

Brief facts

Respondent no. 1 along with his mother were joint owners of the property situated at Paiki Village Kasaba Khed, Khed Taluk, within the limits of Khed Municipal Council, Maharashtra (“Suit Property”). The appellant was a tenant in the Suit Property.
By and under an unregistered Agreement to Sell dated September 3, 2003 (“said Agreement”) executed on a stamp paper of INR 50 (Indian Rupees fifty), respondent No. 1’s mother, agreed to sell the Suit Property to the appellant for a consideration of INR 11,00,000 (Indian Rupees eleven lakh) on the terms and conditions mentioned therein. The said Agreement provided the timeline within which the sale deed was to be executed, upon which the possession would be handed over on ownership basis. The same was also reaffirmed by an extension agreement dated July 28, 2004. Pursuant to the demise of respondent no.1’s mother, respondent no 1 became the absolute owner of the Suit Property. The appellant filed a suit[2] for specific performance of the said Agreement before the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ratnagiri (“Trial Court”).
The respondents filed an application under Section 34 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act before the Trial Court for impounding the said Agreement on the ground that the said Agreement was not sufficiently stamped. The appellant who was already in possession of the Suit Property in the capacity as a tenant, claimed that the said Agreement did not amount to a conveyance and that no stamp duty was payable at that stage. The appellant argued that his occupation of the Suit Property as a tenant was not part of the sale transaction. The appellant further claimed that after completion of the sale transaction, the possession of the Suit Property would be given to the appellant on ownership basis.
The Trial Court, vide order dated August 3, 2015 (“Trial Court Order”) allowed the application, impounded the said Agreement and directed that the same be sent to the Register of Stamps for recovery of deficit stamp duty. The Appellant’s contention that no stamp duty was required as it was not a conveyance was rejected.
The appellant challenged the Trial Court’s Order, but the Bombay High Court dismissed the writ petition[3], upholding the impounding of the said Agreement and stamp duty recovery. The Bombay High Court ruled that since the appellant remained in possession of the Suit Property, the said Agreement was ‘deemed conveyance’ under the Explanation of the Maharashtra Stamp Act.
The order of Bombay High Court came to be challenged by the appellant before the Supreme Court.

Issue

The Supreme Court in the civil appeal framed the following question of law:

“Whether the Appellant is liable to pay stamp duty and penalty on the Agreement to Sell dated 3^rd September, 2003 in respect of the Suit Property”.

Finding and analysis

The legal position that stamp duty is applicable on the instrument rather than the transaction was re-affirmed by the Supreme Court. Thus, even if the actual transfer of ownership occurs later, the agreement itself can attract stamp if possession has been given.
The Explanation provides that an agreement to sell an immovable property is considered as a conveyance, if under such agreement possession is transferred or agreed to be transferred.
The Supreme Court referred to its judgments in the matters of Veena Hasmukh Jain vs. State of Maharashtra[4], and Shyamsundar Radheshyam Agarwal vs. Pushpabai Nilkanth Patil[5], whereunder it had held that in case of an agreement to sell immovable property if possession is transferred at any time without executing the conveyance such an instrument is deemed to be a ‘conveyance’.
The Supreme Court stated that the intent in equating the agreement at par with a conveyance, was with an object to realise the revenue at the earliest point of time. It further held that since possession was given to the appellant before the said Agreement, possessory rights protected under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 would also be derived and therefore the same requires payment of proper stamp duty.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed that an agreement to sell attracts stamp duty as a conveyance under the Maharashtra Stamp Act if possession of property is given.

This Prism has been prepared by:

Farid Karachiwala
Partner

Vishwa Mehta
Associate

For more details, please contact [email protected]

[1] 2025 INSC 213 (Civil Appeal No. 2549 of 2025)

[2] Special Civil Suit No. 65 of 2012

[3] Writ petition No. 3246 of 2016

[4] (1999) 5 SCC 725: 1999 SCC Online SC 78

[5] (2024) 10 SCC 324

Tags JSA, Judgement, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, Legal Updates, Maharashtra Stamp Act, Real Estate, Stamp Duty, Supreme Court

Home Buyer’s Remedies for Delayed Projects

An estimated 2,000 housing projects across 42 Indian cities have stalled, totaling 5.08

lakh units as of 2024, leaving thousands of homebuyers in limbo. The legal experts share the legal remedies available to the homebuyers in case of a delayed project

Please click here to read the full article by Farid Karachiwala published in Realty+.

Tags Articles, Corporate, Disputes, JSA, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, Legal Updates, Real Estate

JSA represented and advised Sai Swami Realtors LLP for land acquisition

JSA investigated the title and drafted the transactional documents of purchase for Sai Swami Realtors LLP to acquire lands bearing (1) Survey Nos. 46/B/Part/3 admeasuring 31 Hectares 23 Ares equivalent to 3,12,300 sq. mtrs., (2) Survey Nos. 46/B/2 admeasuring 8 Hectares 9 Ares equivalent to 80,930 sq. mtrs. and Survey No. 47 admeasuring 83 Ares equivalent to 8,370 sq. mtrs. and (3) Survey No. 46/B/1 admeasuring 17 Hectares 32 Ares equivalent to 1,73,200 sq. mtrs., at Village Achole, Taluka Vasai, District Palghar, from Hard Rock Construction Company Private Limited and Mr. Nitinkumar Bhagwandas Shah.

Deal Value:- INR 198,00,00,000/-

Our real estate team comprises Lead Partner – Farid Karachiwala and Associate – Vishwa Mehta.

Tags Dispute Resolution, Investigations, Real Estate

JSA Prism | Real Estate | December 2024

Please click here to download the Prism as a PDF.

The Supreme Court of India clarifies the law on registration and stamping of a sale certificate issued in pursuance of an auction sale by a court

The Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) in its recent judgement in The State of Punjab and Another vs. Ferrous Alloy Forgings Private Limited and Ors[1], has held that (a) a sale certificate issued under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) is not compulsorily registrable; (b) no stamp duty in terms of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (“Stamp Act”), is payable when a copy of the certificate forwarded by the Registry of the Court to the registering authorities, for filing as required under the Registration Act, 1908 (“Registration Act”); and (c) the requirement to pay stamp duty would arise only when the person in whose favour the sale certificate is issued, voluntarily presents the sale certificate for registration or when the sale certificate is used to establish right/title over the property, in any proceedings. This judgement of the Supreme Court is significant since it clarifies the law on stamping and registration requirements of a sale certificate issued under the CPC and settles the principle of law on passing of title in an auction sale under CPC.

Brief facts

Ferrous Alloy Forgings Private Limited (“FAFPL”) was the purchaser of properties sold in a public auction conducted by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana High Court (“P&H HC”) in the liquidation process of Punjab United Forge Limited. In terms of Order XXI, Rule 92 of the CPC, the sale was confirmed in favour of FAFPL by the P&H HC vide order dated October 10, 1996. An application was filed before the P&H HC by FAFPL seeking issuance of sale certificate, which vide order dated April 13, 1999[2] held that stamp duty is payable on the sale certificate as applicable to a conveyance. The Registrar of P&H HC (“Registrar”) demanded FAFPL to pay stamp duty as applicable to a conveyance for issuing the sale certificate. Challenging the said directions of the Registrar, FAFPL filed a writ petition, wherein the division bench of the P&H HC held[3] that the Registrar does not have powers to collect the stamp duty on a sale certificate and the Registrar is merely required to issue the original sale certificate to the auction purchaser and forward a copy of the same to the jurisdictional Sub-Registrar as per the Registration Act. Challenging the said order, the Revenue Department preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court.

Decision of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court dealt with various judicial precedents on the subject matters and held as under:

Passing of title in an auction sale under CPC: The Supreme Court relied on its judgment in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Pramod Kumar Gupta[4] and held that the title to the property sold in an auction under the CPC passes on to the auction purchaser when the objections to the sale are disposed of, confirming the sale in terms of Order XXI, Rule 92 of the CPC. Upon such confirmation, the sale becomes absolute and the title is vested with the auction purchaser[5].
Nature of a sale certificate: The Supreme Court held that since the title passes upon confirmation under Order XXI Rule 92 of the CPC, the sale certificate issued thereunder is a mere formal declaration of the sale confirmation; and the sale certificate does not create or extinguish any title over the property. The Supreme Court, therefore, clarified that the sale certificate would not attract any stamp duty as applicable to an instrument of conveyance.
Sale certificate is not compulsorily registrable: The Supreme Court relied on Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act and clarified that the sale certificate issued by the Registrar of the P&H HC in pursuance of a public auction is not a non-testamentary document requiring registration under Section 17(1) of the Registration Act. Therefore, it was held that a sale certificate issued under Order XXI, Rule 94 of the CPC is not compulsorily registrable. It was further clarified that the Registrar is merely required to forward a copy of the sale certificate to the jurisdictional Sub-Registrar in terms of Section 89(4) of the Registration Act for the purpose of filing the same in book 1. The Supreme Court relied on its earlier decision in Inspector General of Registration and Another vs. G. Madhurambal and Anr[6] and clarified that once the copy of the sale certificate is forwarded to the Sub-Registrar’s office for filing in book 1, the same has the effect of registration and no further action is required.
Stamping of sale certificates: The Supreme Court held that the stamp duty in terms of Article 18 read with Article 23 of Schedule 1 to the Stamp Act will have to be paid on the original sale certificate, when the same is presented by the auction purchaser or when the certificate is relied on or used for any purpose to establish the title.

In addition to the above, the appellants had contended that FAFPL had alternate remedy of filing an appeal against the order of the Company Court in pursuance of which the Registrar issued the directions; and hence a writ petition was not maintainable. While rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court reiterated the position of law that availability of alternative remedy does not divest the writ jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if the case warrant such interference.

Conclusion

The judgement consolidates and clarifies the position of law on the nature of the sale certificate as an instrument evidencing title; and stamping and registration requirements of a sale certificate issued by the officer of a Court for sale of properties through public auction under the CPC. This judgement resolves the conflicting views taken by the officers of various High Courts and consolidates the position of law on the subject. This judgement will assist the purchasers who acquire properties in public auctions conducted in execution proceedings.

This Prism has been prepared by:

Vinod Kumar
Partner

Srinivasan M.D
Partner

Dharaniya Sri K.M
Associate

For more details, please contact [email protected]

[1] Judgement dated November 19, 2024, in C.A. No. 12527 of 2024. Neutral Citation 2024 INSC 890

[2] CA No. 554 of 1998

[3] Judgement dated November 28, 2013, in Civil Writ Petition No.11055 of 2001 (O&M)

[4] AIR 1991 SC 401.

[5] Arvind Kumar vs. Govt. Of India and Ors reported in (2007) 5 SCC 745

[6] 2022 SCC Online SC 2079.

Tags Code of Civil Procedure, CPC, JSA, Judgement, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, Legal Updates, Real Estate, Supreme Court

JSA Prism | Real Estate | December 2024

Please click here to download the Prism as a PDF.

Revocation of gift deeds: The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) recently in N. Thajudeen vs. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board[1], examined the questions around revocation of a gift deed inter alia in terms of Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TOPA”). At the outset, the Hon’ble Supreme Court concluded that the gift deed in question: (a) was accepted by the donee as stated in the deed itself; (b) had no provisions to indicate of any agreement on its revocation under any circumstances or at will; and (c) was not in the form of a contract that could otherwise be rescinded. Accordingly, the test under Section 126 of TOPA were not satisfied for valid revocation, and the Supreme Court hence concluded that the revocation of the gift deed in the said matter was void ab initio and dismissed the appeal on that and other grounds.

Brief facts

The appellant in this case (“Appellant”) executed a Gift Deed dated March 5, 1983 (“Gift Deed”) gifting a property situated in Cuddalore district of Tamil Nadu in favour of The Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board (“Respondent”). In terms of the Gift Deed, the property was gifted for the purpose of manufacturing khadi-lungi, khadi yarn, etc, with the condition that the Respondent must not transfer the said suit property for its own self-interest. The Appellant executed a Revocation Deed dated August 17, 1987 (“Revocation Deed”) revoking the gift made pursuant to the Gift Deed.

The Respondent filed a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the said property, which was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the Gift Deed was not valid as it was never accepted and acted upon. The Respondent preferred an appeal before the district court, which reversed the order of the trial court and decreed the suit. In decreeing the suit, the district court held that the gift had been accepted, acted upon, was valid and that in the absence of any clause in the Gift Deed authorising revocation, the Gift Deed could not have been revoked. The second appeal filed by the Appellant before the Madras High Court was dismissed. Thereafter, the Appellant filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court.

Issues

The following substantive issues came up for consideration before the Supreme Court:

whether the Gift Deed was accepted and the gift valid? and
whether the Gift Deed had been validly revoked vide the Revocation Deed?

Analysis and findings

On the first issue, the Supreme Court examined the Gift Deed and certain other facts to ascertain if the gift had been accepted. The Supreme Court noted that the Gift Deed itself stated that the gift stood accepted by the Respondent from the date of the Gift Deed and that the suit property had been accepted for the purpose of manufacturing khadi-lungi, khadi-yarn, etc. The Supreme Court determined that this was sufficient proof of acceptance. Further, the Supreme Court noted that pursuant to the acceptance of the Gift Deed, the Respondent had applied for the mutation of its name to the revenue authorities; and had also issued a memo on September 16, 1983 which proved that the Respondent had taken possession of the suit property and had proceeded to construct on it. Basis the aforesaid, the Supreme Court concluded that the gift had been accepted and duly acted upon by the Respondent and hence cannot be held to be invalid for want of acceptance.

On the second issue relating to the revocation, the Supreme Court noted from the facts that: (a) as per the Gift Deed, neither the Appellant nor his legal heirs would have or continue to have any right or interest in the suit property from the time and date of the Gift Deed; (b) the gift was with the Appellant’s full consent and from the date of the gift itself; and (c) the Respondent had accepted the suit property for the use and purpose specified therein. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the gift was absolute with no right reserved for its revocation in any contingency.

Further the Supreme Court held that a gift that is validly made can be suspended or revoked only under certain contingencies as contemplated under Section 126 of the TOPA. As per Section 126 of the TOPA: (a) a gift may be suspended or revoked, as agreed between the donor and donee, on the happening of any specified event which does not depend on the will of the donor; and (b) a gift may also be revoked in any of the cases (save want or failure of consideration) in which, if it were a contract, it might be rescinded. Section 126 of the TOPA also states that a gift in which the parties agree that it can be revoked at the mere will of the donor will be void wholly or in part.

The Supreme Court analysed whether any of the contingencies under Section 126 of the TOPA are applicable to the present case and noted that: (a) there is no indication under the Gift Deed that the Appellant and the Respondent have agreed for the revocation of the Gift Deed for any reason, much less on the happening of any specified event. Hence the first exception permitting revocation of the Gift Deed was not attracted; and (b) the Gift Deed was not in the form of a contract that could be rescinded and hence the second exception was also not attracted. Basis the above, the Supreme Court held that the revocation was invalid and the Revocation Deed was void ab initio and of no consequence.

Separately, the Supreme Court also held that the non-utilisation of the suit property for the stated purpose (i.e. manufacturing khadi-lungi, khadi-yarn, etc.), and keeping it vacant, while being a disobedience of the object of the gift, by itself would not attract the power to revoke the Gift Deed. Particularly, such revocation would not be valid if there is no stipulation in the Gift Deed that the gift could be revoked if the suit property was not utilised for the stated purpose.

In addition to the aforesaid substantive issues, the Supreme Court also considered the Appellant’s argument that the suit filed by the Respondent is barred by limitation since it was not filed within 3 (three) years from the date of Revocation Deed. On this issue the Supreme Court held that once the Gift Deed was validly executed and had resulted in the absolute transfer of title in favour of the Respondent, the same was not liable to be revoked, and as such the Revocation Deed was meaningless especially for the purposes of calculating the period of limitation for instituting the suit. In the case at hand, the Supreme Court noted that the suit was not simply for the declaration of title but rather for a further relief for recovery of possession. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that in a suit for declaration of title, when an additional relief is claimed beyond the mere declaration, the declaration of title becomes ancillary to the primary relief sought. For the purposes of limitation, the suit is governed by the limitation period applicable to the additional relief claimed. As the further relief sought was for the recovery of possession based on title, the limitation would be 12 (twelve) years in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court hence held that the present suit was within the prescribed limitation period.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court thus held that: (a) in the present case since the Gift Deed was accepted and acted upon, it could not be revoked since there was no express right to do revoke included in the deed; and (b) in any case the provisions under Section 126 of the TOPA were not satisfied for such revocation. Accordingly, the Revocation Deed was void ab initio and of no legal effect. The Supreme Court further noted that while the suit property was not used for the intended purpose (i.e. manufacturing of khadi goods), this by itself would not attract the power to revoke the Gift Deed since the Gift Deed did not stipulate revocation for non-utilisation of the suit property for the stated purpose.

This Prism has been prepared by:

Varun Sriram
Partner

Varsha Srinivasan
Principal Associate

Bharkavi S
Senior Associate

For more details, please contact [email protected].

[1] Civil appeal no. 6333 of 2013

Tags JSA, JSA Prism, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, Legal Updates, Real Estate, Supreme Court, Transfer of Property Act

HomeLane acquires DesignCafe, raises primary funds from an investor club consisting of Hero Enterprise, Claypond Capital Partners, WestBridge and others

JSA represented and assisted HomeLane on a composite transaction involving the acquisition of DesignCafe by HomeLane and a primary fundraise by HomeLane from a group of investors including WestBridge and other investors of DesignCafe and new investors, Hero Enterprise and Claypond Capital Partners.

HomeLane has acquired a majority shareholding in DesignCafe with a commitment to acquire 100% of DesignCafe in the future. JSA assisted HomeLane with the legal due diligence on DesignCafe, structuring of the proposed transaction, the drafting, negotiation and finalisation of transaction documents and the closing of the transaction.

HomeLane and DesignCafe are prominent players in the fast-growing organized home interiors segment in India.

The deal signals consolidation in the highly competitive home interiors segment in India, with the HomeLane – DesignCafe combine being valued at about INR 3000 crores and aiming for profitability in 2024 – 2025. Post the closing, the entities will target distinct market segments and expect to capitalise on synergies arising from DesignCafe’s manufacturing capabilities, joint marketing efforts and streamlined supply chain, operations and procurement.

Our Transaction Team Comprised Joint Managing Partner – Vivek K Chandy, Partners – Saurya Bhattacharya and Nikhil P. Joseph, Senior Associates – Alby Joseph, Shika Suresh and Associates – Rishi Sandill, Maria Joven Vellara, Megha Kumari, Deviah Chinnappa, and Company Secretary – Swati Hegde.

Tags Acquisition, DesignCafe, HomeLane, JSA, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers

Enhancing secure engagement and returns through small and medium real estate investment trusts

Real estate has long been a cornerstone of wealth creation, offering investors a tangible asset with the potential for steady income and long-term capital appreciation. In the context of India, real estate holdings constitute a significant portion of the wealth portfolio of several asset creators. However, in recent years, the real estate market in India has witnessed a significant surge in activity, propelling it to the forefront of investment options. This growth is not only confined to traditional segments such as residential properties, but also new exciting investment avenues including logistics and commercial properties. In turn, this has created a more diversified and lucrative investment landscape.

Please click here to read the full article by Gerald Manoharan, published in IBA.

Tags Investment, JSA, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, Real Estate

Recent amendments made to the stamp duty payable on various instruments in Tamil Nadu

Please click here to download the Prism as PDF.

The Government of Tamil Nadu (“GoTN”) had passed an amendment act i.e., the Indian Stamp (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 2023 (“Amendment Act”), wherein the stamp duty payable in relation to certain instruments are revised. The revised stamp duty are effective from May 3, 2024.

S.No.	Instrument	Relevant Article of the Schedule I to the Act	Stamp Duty Prior to Amendment	Stamp Duty Pursuant to Amendment
1.	Adoption deed	3	INR 100 (Indian Rupees one hundred)	INR 1,000 (Indian Rupees one thousand)
2.	Affidavit including affirmation or declaration	4	INR 20 (Indian Rupees twenty)	INR 200 (Indian Rupees two hundred)
3.	Agreement (Not otherwise provided for)	5(j)	INR 20 (Indian Rupees twenty)	INR 200 (Indian Rupees two hundred)
4.	Articles of Association	10	INR 300 (Indian Rupees three hundred)	0.05% on the authorised share capital of the company subject to a maximum of INR 5,00,000 (Indian Rupees fifty thousand)
5.	Cancellation	17	INR 50 (Indian Rupees fifty) for instrument (any instrument by which any instrument previously executed is cancelled) if attested and not otherwise provided.	INR 1,000 (Indian Rupees one thousand) for instrument (any instrument by which any instrument previously executed is cancelled), if attested whether it involves transfer of property or not and not otherwise provided for.
6.	Copy or Extract certified to be a true copy or extract by or by order of any public offer and not chargeable under the law for the tile being in force relating to Court fees	24(i)	INR 5 (Indian Rupees five)	INR 100 (Indian Rupees one hundred)
7.		24(ii)	INR 20 (Indian Rupees twenty) in any other case	INR 100 (Indian Rupees one hundred) in any other case
8.	Counterpart or Duplicate if the duty with which the original instrument is chargeable exceed five rupees or any other case	25(b)	INR 20 (Indian Rupees twenty)	INR 500 (Indian Rupees five hundred)
9.	Lease where the period of lease is below thirty years	35(a)	1% on the rent, fine, premium or advance, if any payable.	1% on the rent, fine, premium or advance or security deposit, if any, payable.
10.	Lease where the period of lease is above thirty years and up to ninety-nine years	35(b)	4 % on the rent, fine, premium or advance, if any payable.	4 % on the rent, fine, premium or advance or security deposit, if any, payable.
11.	Lease where the period of lease is above ninety-nine years	35(c)	7% on the rent, fine, premium or advance, if any payable.	7% on the rent, fine, premium or advance or security deposit, if any, payable.
12.	Memorandum of Association	39	INR 200 (Indian Rupees two hundred) if accompanied by Articles of Association (or) INR 500 (Indian Rupees five hundred) if not so accompanied	INR 200 (Indian Rupees two hundred)
13.	Partition deed executed between non-family members	45(b)	4% for the amount of the value of the separated shares of the property	4% for the amount of the market value of the separated shares of the property
14.	Partnership	46A	INR 300 (Indian Rupees three hundred)	INR 1000 (Indian Rupees one thousand)
15.	Power of attorney executed solely for registration or admitting execution	48 (a)	INR 5 (Indian Rupees five)	INR 500 (Indian Rupees five hundred)
16.	Power of attorney when authorizing one person or more to act in a single transaction other than the case mentioned in clause 48(a)	48 (b)	INR 15 (Indian Rupees fifteen)	INR 500 (Indian Rupees five hundred)
17.	Power of attorney when authorizing not more than five persons to act jointly and severally in more than one transaction or generally	48 (c)	INR 100 (Indian Rupees one hundred)	INR 1000 (Indian Rupees one thousand)
18.	Power of attorney when authorizing more than five but not more than ten person to act jointly and severally in more than one transaction or generally.	48(d)	INR 175 (Indian Rupees one hundred seventy-five)	INR 1000 (Indian Rupees one thousand)
19.	Power of Attorney to sell immovable property for consideration	48(e)	5% on consideration	5% on market value
20.	Power of Attorney without consideration granted in favour of family member	48(f)	INR 20 (Indian Rupees twenty) for each person authorized	INR 1000 (Indian Rupees one thousand)
21.	Power of Attorney without consideration granted in favour of non- family member (newly inserted)	48(g)		1% on market value of the immovable property
22.	Power of attorney in any other case	48(h)	–	INR 1000 (Indian Rupees one thousand) for each person authorized
23.	Reconveyance of Mortgaged Property	54(b)(i)	INR 80 (Indian Rupees eighty)	INR 1000 (Indian Rupees one thousand)
24.		54(b)(ii)	INR 70 (Indian Rupees seventy)	INR 1000 (Indian Rupees one thousand)
25.	Security Bond	57	INR 80 (Indian Rupees eighty)	INR 500 (Indian Rupees five hundred)
26.	Revocation of Settlement	58(b)	INR 80 (Indian Rupees eighty)	INR 1000 (Indian Rupees one thousand)
27.	Surrender of lease	61	INR 40 (Indian Rupees forty)	INR 1000 (Indian Rupees one thousand)
28.	Transfer relating to trust	62 (e)	INR 30 (Indian Rupees thirty)	INR 1000 (Indian Rupees one thousand)
29.	Declaration of Trust	64 (a)	INR 180 (Indian Rupees one hundred eighty)	INR 1000 (Indian Rupees one thousand)
30.	Revocation of Trust	64(b)	INR 120 (Indian Rupees one hundred twenty)	INR 1000 (Indian Rupees one thousand)

In addition to the above, the explanation of the word ‘family’ as set out in Article 55 is also amended to include “the legal heirs of a deceased family member, if any”. Further, the amended explanation of the word ‘family’ is also extended to articles 45(b), 46(b) and 48.

Conclusion

The Amendment Act is a significant revision to the stamp duty levied on various instruments to the prevailing times, which was otherwise levied on obsolete duty. Also, the extension of the definition of the word ‘family’ to other instruments will promote innovative and unique structures in Estate Planning and Real Estate Transactions.

This Prism has been prepared by: