JSA Prism | Employment | November 2025

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Supreme Court’s interpretation of the limitation period in filing sexual harassment complaints under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition, and Redressal) Act, 2013

The Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) in its recent judgement in Vaneeta Patnaik vs. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti and Ors.[1], addressed the question on limitation period in filing complaints of sexual harassment under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition, and Redressal) Act, 2013 (“POSH Act”).

With a ruling that such complaint was time-barred and consequently, could not be examined on merits, the Supreme Court directed that the judgment itself must be included as a permanent part of the respondent’s resume. This ruling re-affirms the settled position of law of limitation applicable to complaints under the POSH Act, while simultaneously imposing an out of the ordinary moral sanction on the accused, unprecedented in this space.

Brief facts

Ms. Vaneeta Patnaik (hereinafter referred to as the “Appellant”) was a faculty member at West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences (“NUJS”). The Appellant alleged that Dr. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti (“Respondent No. 1”), the then Vice-Chancellor of NUJS, harassed the Appellant with a series of unwelcome advances spanning 4 (four) years, including invitations to dinner, inappropriate physical contact, and requests to develop a personal relationship.

The last alleged incident of sexual harassment occurred in April 2023, when the Appellant claimed that the Respondent No. 1 again asked the Appellant to accompany him on a trip and threatened that a refusal could impact her career. She contended that her rejection of these advances resulted in various administrative actions and inquiries lodged against her on fabricated allegations of misuse of position. Subsequently, in August 2023, the Appellant was removed from her additional post as Director of a centre, and an inquiry was initiated against her concerning project funds based on a complaint from other faculty members and the National Foundation of Corporate Governance (“NFCG”).

The Appellant then made claims of harassment and victimisation to NUJS authorities via email and other correspondence but did not refer to sexual harassment in these communications. However, on December 26, 2023, the Appellant lodged a formal complaint with the Local Complaint Committee (“LCC”) alleging sexual harassment by Respondent No.1. The LCC rejected her sexual harassment complaint as being barred by the limitation period prescribed under the POSH Act. Under the POSH Act, a complaint of sexual harassment has to be filed within the prescribed period of 3 (three) months or within the extended period of 6 (six) months. Aggrieved by rejection of her complaint, the Appellant approached the Calcutta High Court (“Calcutta HC”) through a writ petition.

Calcutta HC Proceedings

Single bench ruling

The single judge of the Calcutta HC found that the complaint ought to be examined on its merits, reasoning that the Appellant faced a hostile work environment beyond April 2023, so the complaint remained within limitation through a ‘continuing wrong’ analysis. The single judge directed the LCC to reconsider the complaint on merits.

Division bench appeal

On appeal, the division bench of the Calcutta HC disagreed with the ruling of the single judge holding that the acts after April 2023 were the collective decision of the Executive Council, and not a personal act of Respondent No.1. The division bench held the alleged acts were not sexual harassment or directly linked to earlier allegations and noted the Appellant’s omission to allege sexual harassment in her email communications with the Executive Council and other NUJS authorities. The division bench upheld the LCC’s dismissal of the complaint, rejecting the ‘continuing wrong’ argument except where fresh causes of action arise, and stressed the importance of proximity, direct connection, and a reasonable outer cap to the limitation period under the POSH Act.

Issues

Now the questions for consideration with the Supreme Court are as follows:

whether the complaint filed by the Appellant was within the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 9 of the POSH Act and whether the division bench of the Calcutta HC is justified in upholding the LCC’s rejection of the complaint as time-barred?
whether the administrative actions taken by the Executive Council could be construed as ‘continuing’ sexual harassment or ‘connected circumstances’ under Section 3 of the POSH Act, thus extending limitation?

Analysis and findings

The Supreme Court’s analysis is based on the interpretation and application of Sections 2(n) and 3 of the POSH Act. The Supreme Court stated that ‘sexual harassment’, as defined in Section 2(n) of the POSH Act, includes any unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature, with Section 3 of the POSH Act further expanding the scope to include threats, intimidation, or a hostile work environment directly connected to such conduct.

On the question of limitation, the Supreme Court emphasised that under Section 9 of the POSH Act, a complaint must be filed within 3 (three) months of the last incident, extendable by another 3 (three) months due to prevailing circumstances that prevent a woman from filing the complaint within the prescribed period. The Supreme Court examined whether the Appellant’s removal from the position of ‘Director’ by the Executive Council after April 2023 could qualify as a ‘continuing wrong’ or an extension of any form of sexual harassment, thus justifying the time-barred complaint of the Appellant. To decide on the above, the Supreme Court drew precedent to the case of Union of India vs. Tarsem Singh[2], wherein the Supreme Court had clarified that a ‘continuing wrong’ is when the injury itself persists, and whereas a ‘recurring wrong’ is when a fresh cause of action arises each time.

Applying this framework, the Supreme Court affirmed that the last alleged sexual harassment occurred in April 2023 and the subsequent administrative action of the Appellant’s removal as Director, being a result of unrelated complaints and collective decisions of the Executive Council and NFCG, which could not be solely attributable to the actions of the Respondent No.1, as the decision to initiate an inquiry was a collective decision and not a unilateral one taken by Respondent No. 1. Additionally, the Supreme Court further referred to the expressions ‘in relation to’ or ‘connected with’ used in Section 3(2) of the POSH Act. The use of these expressions clearly demonstrates that there has to be a clear link between the action complained and an overt act of sexual harassment. In this case, the Supreme Court was unable to draw such a direct link between the last incident of sexual harassment that took place in April 2023 and the actions that happened subsequently between April 2023 and December 2023.Thus, the injury due to the harassment did not persist, and later administrative actions cannot be deemed an extension of the original harassment.

The Supreme Court further criticised the Appellant for not mentioning sexual harassment in her communications with the Chancellor and Executive Council after April 2023, suggesting the direct link had been broken, with the incident of April 2023, remaining as the last event related to sexual harassment.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court observed that that the alleged sexual harassment ended in April 2023, and the subsequent administrative actions in August 2023, being collective decisions of the Executive Council based on independent complaints, were not a continuation of the alleged sexual harassment but independent, administrative measures. Consequently, these later events did not extend the limitation period, making the complaint filed by the Appellant in December 2023 time barred. However, despite dismissing the appeal on this technical ground, the Supreme Court issued a unique directive requiring that the judgment be made part of Respondent No.1’s permanent professional record, emphasising that the wrong committed against the Appellant must not be forgotten. The Supreme Court further directed Respondent No. 1 to personally ensure strict compliance with this order.

Conclusion

While the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, it upheld the division bench’s decision that the complaint was time-barred. The Supreme Court’s rationale in the present judgment provides valuable jurisprudence, clarifying the severity of limitation period under the POSH Act and the necessity of demonstrating a direct nexus between subsequent administrative actions and alleged sexual harassment as a ‘continuing wrong’ for the purposes of extending limitation. However, this raises the question whether strict limitation serves justice in harassment contexts or adds more pressure on victims of sexual harassment to adhere to procedural aspects instead of the substantive purpose of the POSH Act.

Earlier, in contrast, the High Court of Madras (“Madras HC”) in R. Mohanakrishnan vs. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Coimbatore Range and Anr.^[3] had clarified that “in cases of serious allegations, such as rape or continuous molestation or harassment, the same would be a continuing misconduct and every day until the situation is redressed or brought to the notice of the appropriate authority would give rise to a fresh cause of action. The purpose of the provision of Limitation in Section 9 has to be understood in this context.” and consequently, had rejected the time-barred limitation for an incident of sexual harassment which last occurred in the year 2018, where the complaint was filed with the LCC in the year 2022. The Madras HC, citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Union of India vs. Dhilip Paul^[4] and Union of India and Anr. vs. Mudrika Singh^[5], had held that the court should not be swayed by hyper-technicalities while considering cases of sexual harassment and cautioned courts to be mindful of the power dynamics that are mired in sexual harassment at the workplace, and the several considerations and deterrents that an aggrieved subordinate of sexual harassment has to face when they consider reporting sexual misconduct of their superior. It must be noted here that in the Madras HC case, the instances reported were of a very serious nature and involved 3 (three) victims, which added to the considerations taken by the court to allow for an extension of the limitation period under the POSH Act.

While the Supreme Court’s ruling in the present case does not outrightly deviate from the Madras HC decision (supra), it does put determination of what constitutes a ‘continuing wrong’ in a grey-area, since the administrative measures taken after April 2023 were considered independently to the earlier threats of detrimental treatment in career progression made by Respondent No.1 to the Appellant, thus treating it as a recurring wrong (each with its own cause of action) and not a continuing one.

Furthermore, in a significant concluding directive, the Supreme Court ordered that this judgment be made part of Respondent No.1’s professional record permanently. This is an unprecedented move as it enforces a symbolic sanction in the absence of an inquiry on merits or a conclusive and formal determination of guilt. It signals that even when legal relief may be barred on account of statutory limitations, courts can still craft moral or administrative accountability. While it serves the interests of the complainant, it raises questions of the deleterious effects of such a direction on the accused’s right to natural justice as it imposes reputational damage on the accused without affording him an opportunity to defend himself. The Supreme Court’s judgment can be seen as having opened a new chapter in workplace harassment jurisprudence in India, provoking discourse on the fine balance between a victim’s justice and an accused’s right to be heard.

This Prism is prepared by: