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The Client, the In-house Counsel, And ‘The Advocate’: How Can A Corporation Navigate Issues Concerning Confidentiality?

Two business professionals shaking hands over a cityscape with digital financial graphs overlayed.

In many legal jurisdictions, including India, confidentiality of professional communications exchanged with a lawyer is protected only if the lawyer is not its ‘client’s’ employee i.e., the lawyer is ‘independent’. An independent lawyer is often negatively defined by the absence of any employment relationship with its client. Exchange of confidential information within a company internally does not fall within the realm of protection afforded to an independent lawyer. This is primarily because a fully salaried employee remains encumbered, or such is the assumption, by commercial considerations suited to the best interests of its employer-corporation.

Please click here to read the full article by Dheeraj Nair, Partner, and Vishrutyi Sahni, Partner, published in BW Legal World.

JSA secures two significant interim reliefs on 27.04.2026 for Commercial and Industrial consumers and captive users in Maharashtra who are reeling under the punitive impact of retrospective levy of tax on sale of electricity and denial of banking of energy.

Judge's gavel resting on a wooden table with a neutral background.

JSA Advocates & Solicitors (JSA) secures two significant interim reliefs on the same day for C&I consumers in Maharashtra who are reeling under the punitive impact of retrospective levy of tax on sale of electricity (“TOSE”) and denial of banking of energy.

 On 27.04.2026, the Bombay High Court has granted interim protection to captive users in Maharashtra from payment of TOSE and directed that no coercive measures should be taken against the non-payment of TOSE amounts by the consumers.

On the same day, the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (“APTEL”) has stayed the revised banking provisions introduced by MERC in its Review Order dated 25.03.2026 and the invoices issued pursuant thereto. APTEL has stayed the recovery of both past and future amounts, and protected consumers from the revised banking provisions that significantly impacted solar consumption in Maharashtra.

Both these interim dispensations are available to consumers till the final outcome of the proceedings and will protect them against the threat of disconnection by MSEDCL. They also serve as a major respite for C&I consumers across Maharashtra both financially and operationally.

It was a pleasure and privilege for the JSA team comprising of Abhishek Munot, Lead Partner; Kunal Kaul, Partner; Tushar Nagar, Partner; Malcolm Desai, Partner; Purvi Shrivastava, Associate and Reet Nagpal, Associate leading this on behalf of the industry in both these highly contested litigations.

Delhi High Court clarifies limits of interim relief under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

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The Delhi High Court in Khurana Educational Society v. Shashi Bala held that appellate interference under Section 37 is limited but justified where interim orders under Section 17 effectively grant final relief. It ruled that directing deposit of substantial usage charges despite disputed lease termination and liability amounted to premature adjudication. Interim measures must remain protective, not impose substantive financial obligations. Fact-intensive issues like mesne profits require full evidentiary determination, not interim fixation.

Please click here to read the full article by Dheeraj Nair, Partner; Angad Baxi, Partner; and Aparna Singh, Associate, published in Lexology.

JSA successfully represents Sanathnagar Enterprises Limited before TSCDRC; order set aside for failure to apply Pecuniary Jurisdiction and Limitation Principles

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JSA Advocates & Solicitors (JSA) successfully represented Sanathnagar Enterprises Limited before the Telangana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Hyderabad, which set aside an order passed by the District Consumer Commission-III, Hyderabad, on the grounds of failure to correctly apply principles of pecuniary jurisdiction and limitation under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

By an order dated April 17, 2026, the State Commission allowed a revision petition filed by M/s Sanathnagar Enterprises Limited and set aside the order dated September 04, 2025 passed by the District Consumer Commission-III, Hyderabad, which had dismissed an application seeking rejection of the complaint on the grounds of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction and limitation. The revision petition was filed under Section 47(1)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 before the State Commission.

The dispute arose from a consumer complaint filed by the Respondents/Complainants seeking refund of alleged excess consideration paid for a flat. The complainants contended that although the flat was marketed based on a saleable area of 1818 sq. ft., the sale deed reflected a carpet area of 1386 sq. ft., which discrepancy came to light on March 30, 2023, during transfer of their home loan from SBI to PNB.

The Petitioner contended that (i) the total consideration paid for the flat was ₹72,78,386, exceeding the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Commission (₹50 lakhs); and (ii) the complaint was barred by limitation as the cause of action arose in 2017–2018, whereas the complaint was filed in 2025. The District Commission rejected these objections, holding that jurisdiction would be determined based on the compensation claimed (₹47 lakhs) and it is within the jurisdiction as per Sec.34(1) of the Consumer Protection Act.

The State Commission, reversing the order of the District Commission, held as follows:

  • The records establish that the total consideration paid for the flat was ₹72,78,386, calculated on a gross area of 1818 sq. ft., whereas the sale deed correctly reflects the carpet area of 1386 sq. ft. after permissible variation.
  • Relying on Ritu Mihir Panchel vs. Union of India (2025), it was held that pecuniary jurisdiction must be determined based on the value of consideration paid and not the compensation claimed.
  • Accordingly, the District Commission lacked pecuniary jurisdiction as the value of the consideration exceeded ₹50 lakhs.
  • Further, the complaint filed in 2025 is beyond the statutory limitation period under Section 69 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.
  • The plea of discovery in 2023 is not supported by the record, which clearly disclosed the carpet area at the relevant time.
  • The District Commission erred in deferring the issue of limitation despite the admitted delay of several years.
  • While deciding an application for rejection of the complaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) read with Section 69 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, the District Commission failed to apply the settled principle that issues of jurisdiction and limitation must be determined on the basis of the pleadings, and instead erroneously deferred these issues for trial.

In view of the above, the State Commission allowed the revision petition and set aside the Impugned Order, holding that the complaint was not maintainable on account of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction and limitation.

The State Commission has reaffirmed that pecuniary jurisdiction and limitation grounds must be determined on the basis of the pleadings, instead of being erroneously deferred for trial.

The JSA team was led by Harshavardhan Abburi, Partner; with support from Poojitha Babbepalli, Principal Associate, Manoj Bhukya, Associate; Phanindranath Chowdary Ponneganti, Associate and Pooja Gandhi, Associate.

JSA represents JSW Steel Limited before the Bombay High Court in significant ruling on Scope of Liability under the Indian Ports Act, 1908

JSA Advocates & Solicitors (JSA) successfully represented JSW Steel Limited before the Bombay High Court in a significant ruling clarifying the scope of liability of an “owner” under Section 14 of the Indian Ports Act, 1908.

By a judgment dated 10 April 2026 (“Judgment”), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court (“Bombay HC”) allowed a writ petition filed by the Petitioner and set aside an order dated 14 October 1996 (“Suspension Order”) issued by the Bombay Port Trust (“Respondent No. 1”), which suspended the Petitioner’s permission to use Respondent No. 1’s waters for transit of barges pursuant to a statutory notice issued under Section 14 of the Indian Ports Act, 1908 (“Act”) b alleging failure to deposit INR 70,00,000/- towards removal of a sunken barge.

The writ petition was admitted, and by an interim order, the Petitioner was directed to deposit INR 70,00,000/- (“Deposit”) before the Bombay HC. The writ petition was subsequently disposed of as infructuous (“Impugned Order”), and Respondent No. 1 was permitted to withdraw the Deposit with interest. The Petitioner challenged the Impugned Order before the Supreme Court, which set it aside, holding that liability under Section 14 of the Act remained to be decided. The matter was accordingly remanded to the Bombay HC.

The dispute arose from the Statutory Notice and the consequent Suspension Order issued by Respondent No. 1, seeking to fasten liability on the Petitioner under Section 14 of the Act following the sinking of a barge engaged by it in Mumbai harbour. The principal issue before the Bombay HC was whether the Petitioner, not being the owner of the barge, could be held liable for removal of the wreckage.

Respondent No. 1 inter alia contended that it was entitled to seek the Deposit from the Petitioner on the basis that: (i) the Petitioner exercised commercial control over the barge and was therefore liable as a “disponent owner”; (ii) the Petitioner had, through its conduct and correspondence, accepted liability as the owner of the barge; (iii) Respondent No. 1 was otherwise empowered under the Act to recover costs for removal of the obstruction caused in its waters; (iv) the Petitioner was liable to pay for the cost for removal of cargo being iron ore which was causing obstruction in the waters; (v) the Petitioner was liable under Section 402 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 (“MSA”) to pay a reasonable sum to the salvor; and (vi) the Petitioner was liable to make payment by virtue of the polluters pay principle.

The Petitioner inter alia contended that: (i) liability under Section 14 of the Act is confined strictly to the “owner” of the vessel and cannot be extended to a party merely availing services through a charter arrangement; (ii) the barge was owned by Shivam Enterprises (“Respondent No. 3”) and chartered by N.S. Guzder & Co. (“Respondent No. 2”) on a time charter basis, under which ownership and control remained with the owner; (iii) the Petitioner was admittedly not the owner of the barge; (iv) in a time charter, ownership and possession remain with the owner; (v) Respondent No. 1 could not rely on other statutory provisions, whether under the Act or under the MSA, in the absence of foundational pleadings or compliance with the prescribed statutory mechanism; and (vi) having invoked action under a particular section of the Act, Respondent No. 1 is restrained from invoking other provisions of the Act or other law without complying with the procedure set out therein (after so many years), as it would be in breach of established principles of natural justice.

The Bombay HC accepted the contentions of the Petitioner and allowed the writ petition holding that:

  1. 1. Section 14 of the Act clearly fastens liability for removal of wreckage only upon the “owner” of the vessel, which expression must be construed in its ordinary legal sense.
  2. Respondent No. 3 was admittedly the owner of the barge, which the Petitioner had merely engaged through a time charter arrangement. A time charter does not transfer ownership or possession of the vessel.
  3. As held in Liverpool and London Steamship Protection and Indemnity Association Limited v. m. t. Symphony & Ors, a disponent owner is an entity that controls the commercial operations of a ship. In the present case, the vessel was taken on a time charter arrangement. The contractual arrangement clearly evidenced that the Petitioner did not have commercial control of the barge. The Petitioner could not be held to be a disponent owner.
  4. The statutory scheme under Section 14, read with Section 57 of the Act, prescribes a specific procedure for removal of wreckage and recovery of associated costs, which must be strictly followed. Respondent No. 1 had not adhered to the prescribed statutory framework, and could not have, by way of the Statutory Notice, unilaterally fastened liability upon a party not contemplated by the provision.
  5. Respondent No. 1’s action by way of the Statutory Notice and Suspension Order could not be sustained against the Petitioner under Section 14 of the Act since the Petitioner was not the owner of the barge.
  6. Respondent No. 1’s belated reliance on other provisions of the Act and the provisions of the MSA was not justified in the absence of any foundational pleadings or compliance with the statutory mechanism prescribed under such provisions.

In light of the above, the Bombay HC held that the Petitioner could not be fastened with liability pursuant to the Statutory Notice issued under Section 14 of the Act, and consequently set aside the Suspension Order as being unsustainable in law. The Court directed Respondent No. 1 to refund to the Petitioner an amount of INR 4,09,25,764 (being the Deposit along with accrued interest) within a period of six weeks.

With this judgement, the Bombay High Court passed a definitive finding on the scope of liability of an “owner” under Section 14 of the Indian Ports Act, 1908.

The JSA team was led by Varghese Thomas, Partner with support from Fatema Kachwalla, Partner and Meher Mistri, Associate.

JSA successfully represented an Allottee before the Telangana High Court in securing an interim stay against an impugned order passed by the RERA Appellate Tribunal

Judge's gavel with apartment buildings in the background, legal documents on desk.

By an interim order dated April 16, 2026 (“Interim Order”), the High Court for the State of Telangana (“Telangana HC”) granted an interim stay in an interlocutory application filed by Mudrakartha Veenadhari (“Appellant” or “Allottee”). The Court stayed the operation and effect of an impugned order dated February 11, 2026. This impugned order had been passed by the Appellate Tribunal in T.A. No. 42 of 2025. The application (I.A. No. 2 of 2026) was filed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C), pending the disposal of the main appeal, SA RERA No. 36 of 2026.

The Appellant, acting as the Original Complainant, brought the petition against M/s. R.R. Konstructions (“Respondent”), the Original Promoter.

Upon reviewing the petition, the Court, presided over by the Honourable Sri Justice Namavarapu Rajeshwar Rao, accepted the contentions at the interim stage and the Court ordered an interim stay on the operation and effect of the Appellate Tribunal’s impugned order dated 11.02.2026.

This matter involves a substantial question of law if Section 3(2) of the RERA Act is to be read conjunctively or disjunctively and the Telangana High Court is to decide on this, which, if decided, will help a lot of Allottees in seeking reliefs from the Promoters/Developers.

The matter was led by Harshavardhan Abburi, Partner, supported by the Constitutional & Administrative Law Litigation Team, including Poojitha Babbepalli, Principal Associate; Manoj Bhukya, Associate; Pooja Gandhi, Associate; and Phanindranath Chowdary Ponneganti, Associate.

JSA achieves a significant victory for UltraTech Cement before the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court, in a challenge to the State’s actions of denying exemption from payment of Electricity Duty for a period of 7 years

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The Rajasthan High Court pronounced a significant judgment recently holding that UltraTech Cement Limited (“UltraTech”), which established captive solar power plants pursuant to Rajasthan Solar Energy Policy, 2019 ( “Solar Policy”), is exempted from payment of electricity duty for a period of 7 years from the commissioning of the RE Plant. The Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court further clarified that the amendment made to the Solar Policy, withdrawing the exemption from payment of electricity duty, cannot divest UltraTech of its accrued rights.

The High Court found that the Solar Policy, though executive in nature, constituted sovereign representation designed to induce substantial investment in solar generation. Since UTCL incurred substantial capex under this representation to set up plants, all the essential ingredients of promissory estoppel were met.

The Court rejected the State’s argument that no enforceable right could stem from a non-statutory executive policy and that exemptions could only be granted via statutory notification under the ED Act. It reasoned that the State cannot justify breaking a promise it consciously made by relying on its own failure to issue a notification. Additionally, the Court dismissed the claim of financial constraints as a valid reason for withdrawal, citing the lack of substantive evidence.

Furthermore, the Court connected the promotion of renewable energy with the constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment under Article 21. It emphasised that arbitrarily or unfairly withdrawing such incentives damages investor confidence.

The Judgment thus establishes that the State offered time-bound fiscal incentives to attract investment in priority sectors, which carry enforceable rights and cannot be withdrawn mid-stream arbitrarily. State accountability in economic policy is essential to maintaining investor confidence and the rule of law.

The JSA team was led by Abhishek Munot, Partner, supported by Kunal Kaul, Partner, and Samikrith Rao, Principal Associate.

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