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Episode 2: Equipping for high-stakes dispute resolution | Transforming India (Season 2)

In the second episode of Season 2 of our video podcast series, Transforming India: The Road to 2047, produced in collaboration with Mint, we explore the evolving landscape of dispute resolution in India.

Titled “Equipping for High-Stakes Dispute Resolution”, this episode is hosted by Alokesh Bhattacharyya and features insights from Amar Gupta, Joint Managing Partner, and Divyam Agarwal, Partner at JSA. The discussion highlights the critical role of India’s legal framework in fostering investor confidence and enabling cross-border commerce.

From arbitration complexities to enforcement hurdles and the need for judicial and regulatory reform, the episode offers a deep dive into India’s journey toward becoming a global hub for dispute resolution.

Tags AmarGupta, ArbitrationLaw, CrossBorderDisputes, DivyamAgarwal, JSA, JSA Law, JSALaw, Leadership, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, LegalPodcastIndia, LegalReformsIndia, LegalUpdates, TransformingIndia2047

JSA Advised Shri Modi Group (Antariksh Hotel & Resorts) on Securing Hotel Operating & Technical Service Agreement with Taj Group/Indian Hotels Company Limited (IHCL)

JSA Advocates & Solicitors advised Shri Modi Group and its affiliate, Antariksh Hotel & Resort Private Limited (“Owner”), on the negotiation, drafting, and execution of a Hotel Management Agreement and a Technical Services Agreement with Indian Hotels Company Limited (IHCL) (“Operator”) for a 153-key upscale hotel property in Jaipur, Rajasthan. This strategic collaboration marks the establishment of a new Taj-branded hotel, further strengthening IHCL’s presence in the region.

The transaction was led by Partner Amitabh Sharma, with support from Paralegal Pratham Jain.

Tags BusinessTransactionsIndia, CorporateLegalAdvisory, HospitalityLawIndia, HotelIndustryIndia, HotelManagementAgreements, IHCLPartnership, JSA, JSALegalExperts, Leading Lawyers, Legal Advisory, LegalAdvisorsIndia, TourismSectorIndia

JSA Advised Goyaz Jewellery on Series A Fundraise Led by Norwest Venture Partners

Elegant jewelry store interior with wooden display cases and soft ambient lighting.

JSA Advocates & Solicitors advised Goyaz Jewellery Private Limited (Goyaz) and its founders, in connection with its Series A fundraise led by Norwest Venture Partners. This round marks Goyaz’s first institutional equity raise, cementing its leadership position in a high demand sector and geography.

The JSA transaction team is being led by Partner Rishabh Gupta, with support from the deal team comprising Principal Associate Akshath Mithal, and Associates Saurabh Chatterji and Tanmayee Shriprasad Apte, and employment team led by Partner Preetha Soman with support from Associates Sneha Mohanty and Rebecca Thomas.

Tags Corporate Law, Goyaz Jewellery, Investment Deal, JSA, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, Legal Advisory, Norwest Venture Partners, Private Equity, Series A fundraise, Startup Funding, VENTURE CAPITAL

JSA represents GlobalLogic Technologies before the Delhi High Court in commercial contract dispute

Judge's gavel resting on a wooden table with a neutral background.

JSA Advocates & Solicitors successfully represented GlobalLogic Technologies Private Limited before the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in setting aside an injunction that had restrained the termination of a commercial contract.

The Court categorically held that where a contract is determinable in nature, equitable relief in the form of an injunction is not maintainable, and any alleged loss can only be compensated by way of damages. By staying the injunction, the Court reaffirmed the settled position that termination of commercial contracts cannot be specifically enforced.

The JSA team was led by Partner Padmaja Kaul, with support from the Commercial Litigation team comprising Senior Associate Kushagra Sah, and Associate Vansh Bhutani.

Tags CommercialContractDisputeIndia, CommercialLitigationExperts, CourtRulingsIndia, DeterminableContracts, DisputeResolutionLawFirm, HighCourtJudgmentIndia, IndianCommercialLaw, InjunctionLawIndia, JSA, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, LegalAdvisoryIndia, LitigationAdvisoryIndia

JSA represents TaskUs India before the Supreme Court in commercial contract dispute

JSA Advocates & Solicitors successfully represented TaskUs India Private Limited before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in securing a stay on an injunction that had restrained the termination of a determinable commercial contract.

The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the settled legal principle that injunctions cannot be granted to specifically enforce commercial arrangements which, by their very nature, are determinable.

The JSA team was led by Partner Padmaja Kaul, with support from the Commercial Litigation team comprising Senior Associate Kushagra Sah, and Associate Vansh Bhutani.

Tags CommercialContractDisputesIndia, CommercialLitigationExperts, CourtStayOrderIndia, DeterminableContractsLaw, DisputeResolutionLawFirm, IndianLegalSystem, InjunctionLawIndia, JSA, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, LegalAdvisoryIndia, LitigationAdvisoryIndia, SupremeCourtJudgmentIndia

JSA Prism | Dispute Resolution | October 2025

Please click here to download the Prism as a PDF.

Supreme Court of India re-affirms that principles of natural justice and public policy of India must be upheld despite the limited scope of judicial interference in challenge to an arbitral award

In a significant ruling, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”), in SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corporation vs. GMR Kamalanga Energy Limited[1], has re-affirmed that under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”), the scope of interference with an arbitral award is narrow. However, the principles of natural justice and the public policy of India are paramount and cannot be ignored or sidelined. The Supreme Court also interpreted Section 28(3) of the Arbitration Act and held that an arbitral tribunal, being a creature of a contract itself, cannot travel beyond its mandate to rewrite the terms of the contract.

Brief facts

The appellant, SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corporation (“SEPCO”), entered into an agreement for Civil Works and Engineering, Erection, Testing and Commissioning (“CWEETC Agreement”) with GMR Kamalanga Energy Limited (“GMRKE”), as an Engineering, Procurement and Construction Contractor. The CWEETC Agreement was executed for construction of 3 (three) coal-fired thermal power plants of 350 (three hundred and fifty) Mega Watt each, at Kamalanga, Odisha (“Project”).
As disputes arose between the parties under the CWEETC Agreement, which also contained an arbitration clause, SEPCO issued a notice of arbitration against GMRKE leading to constitution of a 3 (three) member arbitral tribunal. The parties submitted their claims and counterclaims before the arbitral tribunal.
Upon adjudication of the disputes, an arbitral award dated September 7, 2020, was passed where certain claims of both parties were allowed, to the net effect of GMRKE becoming liable to pay approximately INR 995,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees nine hundred and ninety-five crore) to SEPCO (“Award”).
Assailing the Award, GMRKE moved an application before the High Court of Orissa under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act on the ground of unfair treatment of parties. The Learned Single Judge rejected the arguments of GMRKE and upheld the Award (“Section 34 Judgment”).
Thereafter, GMRKE moved the Division Bench of the High Court of Orissa under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, in appeal against the decision of the Learned Single Judge. The Division Bench allowed the appeal and set aside the Award on finding, inter alia, that:
- the arbitral tribunal based its analysis and findings on mistaken facts as it ignored the ‘No Waiver’ and ’No Oral Modification’ clauses, as contemplated in the CWEETC Agreement;
- the Learned Single Judge wrongly affirmed the Award despite admitting that the decision of the arbitral tribunal on the issue of waiver of contractual notices was based on scant or no evidence; and
- the Award was passed in disregard of binding precedents.
The judgment passed by the Division Bench (“Impugned Judgment”) was challenged by way of a special leave petition before the Supreme Court by SEPCO.

Issues

The Supreme Court dealt with the below issues:

whether the Award was correct in determining oral waiver and/or equity estoppel as against the terms of the contract?
whether discriminatory treatment of parties by the arbitral tribunal amounts to violation of Section 18 of the Arbitration Act and denial of natural justice, thus mandating setting aside of the Award?
what is the extent and scope of judicial review exercisable under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act?

Findings and analysis

While affirming the Impugned Judgment and upholding the decision of the Division Bench to set aside the Award and the Section 34 Judgment, the Supreme Court made the following observations:

Re: The scope and authority of the arbitral tribunal is bound by the terms of the agreement (Section 28(3) of the Arbitration Act)

The arbitral tribunal upheld the assumed waiver of the mandate of contractual notice – despite explicit provisions of the CWEETC Agreement to the contrary – and thus varied the milestone conditions provided under the said Agreement. The Supreme Court observed that such act on the part of the arbitral tribunal amounted to modification of the terms of the contract.

Section 28(3) of the Arbitration Act casts an explicit duty on a tribunal to resolve disputes in accordance with the terms of the contract and trade usages applicable to the transaction. An arbitrator lacks the power to deviate from the terms of the contract while making an award.

Existence and powers of an arbitrator arise out of the agreement between the parties. The terms of the agreement serve as the fundamental basis for the procedure to be adopted by the arbitral tribunal.

Deviation from Section 28(3) of the Arbitration Act is a valid ground for challenging an arbitral award, as it is the primary duty of arbitrators to enforce promises parties have made, and to uphold contract sanctity.

The Division Bench rightly exercised judicial oversight on erroneous and untenable interpretation of terms of the CWEETC Agreement in the Award.

Re: Principles of natural justice vis-à-vis equal treatment of parties.

The arbitral tribunal had unfairly construed the waiver clauses in favour of SEPCO and then went on to apply a different interpretation of the same waiver clauses to the counterclaims of GMRKE.

GMRKE was also not given an opportunity to lead evidence on the issue of waiver (which was decided against it).

When a party is unable to analyse, comment or argue on a contention raised by the other party, it is a breach of natural justice and thereby, also a violation of the most fundamental notions of justice. Arbitral decisions must adhere to the principles of natural justice.

On the issue of discriminatory treatment of parties, the Supreme Court analysed Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The grounds available to a party to challenge an India-seated international commercial arbitration specifically includes the ground – ‘unable to present the case’ – under Section 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Arbitration Act.

In consonance with the above, the Supreme Court held that unequal treatment of parties would fall within the ambit of ‘lack of full opportunity’ under Section 18 of the Arbitration Act which contemplates that the parties must be treated with equality and each party will be given a full opportunity to present his case.

The Division Bench, thus, correctly held that it cannot turn a blind eye to a glaring example of unequal treatment.

Re: Scope of Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act

Section 34 of the Arbitration Act provides for limited judicial intervention on the grounds envisaged therein.

Under Section 34, no independent evaluation is permitted on the merits of an award and a court under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act can only determine whether the court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act has travelled beyond the parameters of the scope therein.

Relying on Project Director, National Highways Authority of India vs. M. Hakeem[2], it was held that courts would ideally reevaluate the substantive arguments on the merits of an award only when the limited grounds laid down under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act are triggered or fulfilled. This interference would be mandated when the perversity so identified in the award goes to the root of the matter.

Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is akin to a second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. As such, a court exercising the mandate of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act ought to employ caution and reluctance to alter the concurrent findings of a Section 34 court. However, where the findings in an award are such as would shock the conscience of the court and the grounds for setting aside the award get triggered, then the award would have to be tested beyond the ‘limited’ scope of judicial interference under Section 37.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that an arbitral tribunal, being a creature of a contract, cannot travel beyond its mandate and rewrite the terms of such contract.
In the present case, the arbitral tribunal acted in violation of principles of natural justice by discriminating between the parties. In this background, the Supreme Court concluded that discriminatory treatment is not compatible with the basic notions of justice.
The Supreme Court also re-affirmed the following established principles in matters of challenge to an arbitral award:
- the scope under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is inherently limited or narrower than Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Thus, the question of re-interpreting the contract with an alternative view does not arise. However, at the Section 37 stage, interference with a decision given by a Section 34 court is justified when the Section 34 court has failed to appreciate the gross violations of the basic principles of adjudication of a dispute;
- while the latent violations of basic principles may not mandate interference, but direct omissions of the mandate of Sections 18 and 28(3) of the Arbitration Act are clearly patent and prima facie violations; and
- courts cannot be made a mere spectator to an attack on the fundamental policy of Indian law and the same allows for reappreciation of the arbitral award by a Section 37 court.
On application of the above principles, it was concluded that despite the limited scope of interference, the Division Bench was obliged to interfere with the arbitral award.
The judgment reinforces several critical and significant principles, including the following:
- while courts must respect party autonomy and finality in arbitration, they cannot ignore fundamental violations of natural justice and public policy. Arbitral proceedings must operate within the framework of fundamental legal principles, contractual boundaries and natural justice; and
- equal treatment of the parties in arbitral proceedings is vital, and each party must be given full opportunity to present its case.

This Prism is prepared by:

Sidharth Sethi
Partner

Shreya Sircar
Partner

Shivangi Pathak
Associate

For more details, please contact [email protected].

[1] 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2088 / 2025 INSC 1171 (decided on 26 September 2025)

[2] (2021) 9 SCC 1

Tags Arbitral Award, Arbitration, Arbitration Act, India Law, JSA, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, Legal Update, Natural Justice, Public Policy, Section 34, Supreme Court of India

JSA Prism | Dispute Resolution | October 2025

Please click here to download the Prism as a PDF.

Supreme Court of India clarifies limits of writ jurisdiction in quashing First Information Reports and charge sheets

The Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) in the case of Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr.[1] delivered a significant ruling clarifying the contours of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (“Constitution”) vis-à-vis the quashing of First Information Reports (“FIRs”) and charge sheets. The judgment draws a clear line between the stage of investigation and the stage at which cognisance of an offence is taken by a competent court. While recognising the High Court’s wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to intervene in appropriate cases, the Supreme Court held that once a judicial order of cognisance intervenes, the remedy of quashing cannot be pursued under Article 226 of the Constitution. Instead, the appropriate remedy lies under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) (previously, Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973), which empowers courts to quash not merely the FIR or the charge sheet, but also the order of cognisance itself.

Brief facts

The case arose from a Writ Petition filed before the Bombay High Court (“Bombay HC”) seeking quashing of an FIR bearing CR No. 648 of 2024, registered on September 12, 2024, at M.I.D.C. Police Station, Solapur (“Writ Petition”). The FIR alleged offences under Sections 420, 406, and 409 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”). While the Writ Petition was pending, the investigation was completed, and a charge sheet was filed before the Trial Court on May 14, 2025. A Division Bench of the Bombay HC, vide its order dated July 1, 2025, disposed of the Writ Petition as infructuous, reasoning that once a charge sheet had been filed, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could not be entertained for quashing the FIR. In doing so, it relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Neeta Singh and Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (“Neeta Singh”)[2].

Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court, contending that the Bombay HC had misapplied the ratio of Neeta Singh and failed to consider the distinct factual matrix of the present case.

Issue

The central question before the Supreme Court was whether the Bombay HC was correct in holding that the filing of a charge sheet renders a writ petition for quashing an FIR infructuous, or whether the Bombay HC retained the jurisdiction to entertain such a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or by moulding relief under Section 528 of the BNSS.

Analysis and findings

The Supreme Court first emphasised the well-established principle, that the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is of a discretionary and extraordinary nature. It is not intended to supplant statutory remedies, but to provide relief where grave injustice or abuse of process is apparent. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the availability of statutory remedies cannot be ignored in criminal matters, particularly once the process of cognisance by a competent court has been initiated.

In this context, the Supreme Court carefully distinguished the facts of the present case from those in Neeta Singh. It observed that the Bombay HC had misread and misapplied the Neetu Singh judgment, overlooking the factual dissimilarities. While Neeta Singh dealt with a situation where the statutory remedy had already been exhausted and the stage of cognisance had long intervened, the present case involved a writ petition already filed and pending at the stage when the charge sheet was submitted. The Supreme Court held that the Bombay HC had erroneously treated the petition as infructuous, thereby unjustly depriving the petitioner of a remedy.

Most importantly, the Supreme Court underlined the scheme of Section 528 of the BNSS, which specifically empowers courts to quash not only an FIR or charge sheet but also the order taking cognisance, provided that the order is specifically assailed with appropriate pleadings and sufficient factual grounds. The Supreme Court further explained that once a charge sheet has been filed and cognisance is taken, Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to nullify the judicial act of taking cognisance. At that stage, litigants must resort to Section 528 of the BNSS. The present petition was filed both under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 528 of the BNSS. Therefore, the Bombay HC had jurisdiction to mould the relief sought by treating the Writ Petition as one invoking Section 528 of the BNSS, rather than dismissing it summarily.

The Supreme Court further emphasised that the filing of a charge sheet and the taking of cognisance represent a legal watershed. Before cognisance, writ jurisdiction remains available to quash FIRs or charge sheets in appropriate cases. After cognisance, the statutory route under Section 528 of the BNSS must be pursued.

Conclusion

This ruling serves as a crucial clarification on the interplay between constitutional and statutory remedies in criminal procedure. It strikes a careful balance between safeguarding individual liberty against vexatious prosecutions and ensuring that the statutory scheme under the BNSS is not circumvented. Different High Courts follow their own set of procedural requirements when it comes to petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 528 of the BNSS, often leading to uneven experiences for litigants. This judgment should also be an occasion to recognise the need for uniformity and reform across jurisdictions.

This Prism has been prepared by:

Dheeraj Nair
Partner

Vishrutyi Sahni
Principal Associate

Sahir Seth
Associate

For more details, please contact [email protected].

[1] SLP (Crl.) No. 13424/2025 (decided on September 3, 2025)

[2] SLP (Crl.) No. 13578/2024 (decided on October 15, 2024)

Tags Charge Sheet, Criminal Law, FIR, India Law, JSA, Judicial Review, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, Legal Update, Supreme Court of India, Writ Jurisdiction

JSA Brief | September 2025

This edition of the JSA Brief showcases JSA authored articles, updates & newsletters and achievements such as deals and events in all practice area over the preceding month (September 2025).

To read further details, click here or refer to the below document.

For more details, please contact [email protected]

*In case the document is not visible on the device you are using, please click the link above.

Tags Articles, Deal Making, Events, JSA, JSA Prism, Legal Updates, Newsletters, Publications, Recognitions

JSA Prism | Dispute Resolution | October 2025

Please click here to download the Prism as a PDF.

Telangana High Court clarifies uniform applicability of the 2018 amendment to the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 across India without the requirement of a separate State notification to its effect

The High Court of Telangana (“Telangana HC”) in the case of M/s. Janset Labs Private Limited vs. Agilent Technologies Private Limited[1] held that the amended ‘specified value’ threshold of INR 3,00,000 (Indian Rupees three lakh) under Section 2(1)(i) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (“CC Act”) (as amended under the Commercial Courts (Amendment) Act, 2018, (“CC Amendment Act”)) applies uniformly across India, including Telangana, without requiring a separate State Government notification. The Telangana HC clarified that ‘specified value’ under Section 2(1)(i) of the CC Act (which determines whether a dispute is commercial) is distinct from ‘pecuniary jurisdiction’ under Section 3(1A) of the CC Act (which defines the monetary limits of courts within a State) and held that the requirement of a notification under Section 3(1A) cannot be imported into Section 2(1)(i).

Brief facts

Agilent Technologies India Private Limited (“Respondent”) filed a commercial suit (“Commercial Suit”) in the Commercial Court, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar (“Commercial Court”) against M/s. Janset Labs Private Limited (“Petitioner”). The Commercial Suit was filed for recovery of a total amount of INR 1,03,58,961 (Indian Rupees one crore three lakh fifty-eight thousand nine hundred and sixty-one), consisting of the principal amount of INR 44,53,396 (Indian Rupees forty-four lakh fifty-three thousand three hundred and ninety-six) along with interest at 18% per annum and damages.
The Petitioner filed an interim application (“Rejection of Plaint”) in the Commercial Suit under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) to dismiss the Commercial Suit on the ground that the suit does not meet the ‘specified value’ provided under Section 2(1)(i) of the CC Act i.e. INR 1,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees one crore) and stated that the amendment under Section 2(1)(i) of the CC Amendment Act reducing the threshold of the “specified value” to INR 3,00,000 (Indian Rupees three lakh) is not applicable in Telangana due to the lack of state notification to its effect. Additionally, the Petitioner contended that segregation of damages is not permissible for computing of the ‘specified value’.
The Commercial Court dismissed the Rejection of Plaint on the ground that the plaint discloses cause of action for filing of the Commercial Suit (“Impugned Order”).
Aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the Petitioner filed the instant Civil Revision Petition (“CRP”) before the Telangana HC arguing that the ‘specified value’ of the Commercial Suit is below INR 1,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees one crore). As such, it does not satisfy the threshold provided under Section 2(1)(i) of the CC Act and must be dismissed. Additionally, it was contended by the Petitioner that the reduced ‘specified value’ of INR 3,00,000 (Indian Rupees three lakh) provided under Section 2(1)(i) of the CC Amendment Act is not applicable in the State of Telangana in the absence of a State notification.

Issues

Whether the amended specified value of INR 3,00,000 (Indian Rupees three lakh) under Section 2(1)(i) of the CC Amendment Act applies to Telangana without a separate State Government notification?
Whether ‘specified value’ under Section 2(1)(i) of the CC Act is distinct from the ‘pecuniary jurisdiction’ prescribed under Section 3(1A) of the CC Act?
Whether the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC for want of jurisdiction?

Findings and analysis

The Telangana HC observed that the ‘specified value’ under Section 2(1)(i) as determined by Section 12 of the CC Act is not less than INR 3,00,000 (Indian Rupees three lakh) pursuant to the CC Amendment Act. The Petitioner’s contention that a separate notification is required by State Government for its application in Telangana was dismissed since the statute confers power only on the Central Government to notify a higher threshold. Therefore, the reduction of the minimum specified value from INR 1,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees one crore) to INR 3,00,000 (Indian Rupees three lakh) as per the amendment applies uniformly to all States and Union Territories without the need for separate State notification.
The Telangana HC further went on to analyze the distinction between ‘specified value’ and ‘pecuniary jurisdiction’ and opined that Section 2(1)(i) of the CC Act refers to the valuation of the commercial dispute to determine whether the dispute qualifies as a commercial dispute at all. It observed that a dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the commercial court if there is: (a) existence of dispute as per Section 2(1)(c) of the CC Act; and (b) the commercial dispute is within the ‘specified value’ under Section 2(1)(i) r/w Section 12 of the CC Act. In contrast, Section 3(1A) of the CC Act fixes the competence-parameters of the court for receiving a commercial suit, meaning whether or not that particular court has the jurisdiction to determine the dispute.
The Telangana HC noted that the requirement of notification by the State Government in Section 3(1A) of the CC Act cannot be read into or imported under Section 2(1)(i). Thus, Telangana does not require any separate notification and the amended INR 3,00,000 (Indian Rupees three lakh) threshold is applied with effect from May 3, 2018.
Given the above, the Petitioner’s contention on segregation of prayers is irrelevant since the dispute falls under the ‘specified value’ of INR 3,00,000 (Indian Rupees three lakh) or more. Accordingly, the CRP was dismissed.

Conclusion

The Telangana HC reaffirmed that the CC Amendment Act operates uniformly across India, including Telangana, without the need for a separate State notification. By clarifying the distinction between ‘specified value’ and ‘pecuniary jurisdiction’, the Telangana HC provided crucial interpretative clarity and reinforced the uniform national applicability of the amended INR 3,00,000 (Indian Rupees three lakh) threshold for commercial disputes.

This Prism is prepared by:

Harshavardhan Abburi
Partner

Poojitha Babbepalli
Principal Associate

Pooja Gandhi
Associate

For more details, please contact [email protected].

[1] Civil Revision Petition No. 1932 of 2025 (decided on September 22, 2025]

Tags Commercial Courts Act, Commercial Disputes, Dispute Resolution, India Law, JSA, Judgment, Leading Law Firm, Leading Lawyers, Legal Update, Litigation, Telangana High Court

JSA Prism | Dispute Resolution | October 2025

Please click here to download the Prism as a PDF.

Delhi High Court has held that an agreement for mere provision of services does not ipso facto qualify as a commercial dispute under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015

The Hon’ble Delhi High Court (“Delhi HC”), in the matter of Chand Mehra and Anr. vs. British Airways PLC[1] has held that for a dispute to qualify as a ‘commercial dispute’ within the meaning of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (“CC Act”), the transaction must inherently involve an element of commerce, trade, business, or finance.

Brief facts

Mr. Chand Mehra and another (“Appellants”) purchased 2 (two) business class tickets from British Airways PLC (“Respondent”) for a total of INR 5,09,918 (Indian Rupees five lakh nine thousand nine hundred and eighty-one). In May 2023, due to a family emergency, the Appellants were constrained to cancel their travel plans and requested the Respondent to issue a refund for the purchase price of the flight tickets. The Respondent informed the Appellants that it would refund an amount of INR 2,04,876 (Indian Rupees two lakh four thousand eight hundred and seventy-six) while an amount of INR 3,05,042 (Indian Rupees three lakh five thousand and forty-two) would be deducted towards cancellation charges. Instead of processing the refund, the Respondent converted the refund amount into a future travel voucher, which could be used at a later date.

The Appellants issued a legal notice on October 9, 2023, demanding a full refund with interest at 18% per annum. As the Respondent failed to provide the refund, the Appellants approached the South-East District Legal Services Authority for pre-institution mediation, which failed since the Respondent did not provide any response. Consequently, the Appellants sought interest as the same rate, along with punitive damages of INR 10,19,836 (Indian Rupees ten lakh nineteen thousand eight hundred and thirty-six) alleging that the Respondent engaged in unethical conduct for unjust enrichment.

The Respondent contested the suit before the District Court and filed a consolidated application seeking either return of the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 or rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (“CPC”) inter alia contending that the matter was not a ‘commercial dispute’ under Section 2 (1) (c) of the CC Act. The District Court allowed the application under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC and held that the plaint did not disclose a ‘commercial dispute’ within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (c) of the CC Act and returned the plaint with liberty to file the same before a court of competent jurisdiction (“Impugned Order”).

The Appellants preferred an appeal before the Delhi HC against the Impugned Order (“Appeal”).

Issue

Whether the plaint filed by the Appellants fell with the purview of a ‘commercial dispute’ under Section 2 (1) (c) of the CC Act?

Findings and analysis

The Delhi HC dismissed the Appeal and inter alia held as follows:

it is undisputed that the purchase of the air tickets resulted in the creation of a contract. However, the mere creation of a contract would not result in a commercial transaction between the parties. The transaction in the present case was sans any element of business, trade, or commerce and could not be termed as an ordinary transaction of merchants or bankers or financiers or traders or of export or import of mercantile or services;
even though the contract between the parties was for provision of services, the same could only be a ‘commercial dispute’ within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (c) of the CC Act if it involved some or the other kind of trade or business or financing. To constitute a commercial dispute arising out of an agreement for services, the agreement or transaction would necessarily have to contain an element of commerce or trade or business, which was absent in the present case;
In Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Limited vs. K.S. Infraspace LLP and Anr.[2] the Supreme Court of India had held that the CC Act was enacted for the specific purpose of creating a judicial forum to provide speedy disposal of high value commercial disputes. Thus, the crucial aspect for instituting a suit under the CC Act would be commercial or business or trading activity and any suit of a high valuation minus these elements could not be instituted under the CC Act.

Conclusion

This decision reinforces the specific and narrow scope of ‘commercial disputes’ under the CC Act. The mere fact that a transaction falls within the broad description of matters under Section 2 (1) (c) of the CC Act would not by itself constitute a commercial dispute. The element of commerce is an inherent feature which cannot be done away with. These clarifications may result in a plethora of non-commercial disputes being removed from the jurisdiction of commercial courts, thus easing the burden on commercial courts in the country.

This Prism is prepared by: