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Delhi High Court reiterates the exclusive role of the Internal Committee in addressing sexual harassment complaints
In the recent case of Prof. Rasal Singh vs. University of Delhi and Ors.[1], a single judge bench of the High Court of Delhi (“Delhi HC”) clarified critical aspects of the procedural framework under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (“POSH Act”). It held that parallel fact-finding mechanisms outside the statutory framework under the POSH Act are de hors the provisions of the statute. It additionally reaffirmed that employers retain inherent powers under service rules to suspend employees pending inquiry, subject to compliance with principles of natural justice and ensuring non-stigmatisation.
Brief facts
Between March 13, 2025 and April 24, 2025, 3 (three) female assistant professors at Ramanujan College (“College”) filed complaints with the College and University of Delhi (“DU”), against the Principal, Prof. Rasal Singh, alleging professional misconduct and behaviour amounting to sexual harassment. Instead of referring the complaints to the statutory Internal Committee (“IC”), DU’s deputy registrar formed an ad hoc fact-finding committee (“Committee”) to examine the allegations. The Committee conducted hearings and submitted a report concluding that (a) charges were of the nature of sexual harassment; (b) complainants felt threatened and unsafe; (c) an environment of fear and anxiety had been created; and (d) there may be unreported instances as part of the current matter.
The Committee recommended that the complaints be referred to DU’s IC. Thereafter, relying on this report and with approval from the Vice Chancellor, DU, the Chairperson of the College passed a suspension order dated September 18, 2025, against Prof. Singh. In response, Prof. Singh challenged the constitution of the Committee, validity of its report, and DU’s suspension order, before the Delhi HC.
Issues
The main issues before the Delhi HC were:
- whether an employer can legally constitute an ad hoc fact-finding committee pursuant to a complaint received under the POSH Act prior to referring the matter to an IC;
- whether an employer has the power to suspend an employee for a case involving allegations under POSH Act; and
- whether the specific suspension order was legally unsustainable by virtue of being ‘stigmatic’ in nature?
Findings and analysis
The Delhi HC undertook a detailed analysis of the statutory scheme under the POSH Act and principles of service jurisprudence governing disciplinary action.
Inherent power of suspension
The Delhi HC held that the power to suspend an employee is an inherent administrative power vested in the employer, rooted in service jurisprudence and traceable to the master-servant relationship itself. Further, it clarified that Section 28 of POSH Act declares the legislation to be “in addition to and not in derogation of” other laws. Therefore, POSH Act is supplementary in nature and neither prescribes the power of suspension, nor does it regulate or restrict its exercise. Power of suspension exists independently of the POSH Act, and it is the service rules that define its scope, limits and the competent authority to exercise it.
Accordingly, employers could place employees under suspension pending inquiry in appropriate cases, including those involving allegations of sexual harassment, provided such action is taken in accordance with service rules and principles of natural justice.
POSH Act creates a self-contained mechanism for redressal
A central aspect of the ruling was Delhi HC’s rejection of DU’s attempt to introduce a parallel fact-finding mechanism. It held that constituting an ad hoc committee to screen or preliminarily assess complaints before they are placed before the IC is not contemplated under the POSH Act and is legally impermissible. Relying on the Supreme Court of India’s observations in Aureliano Fernandes vs. State of Goa[2] and its own observations in Surender Singh vs. Union of India[3], the Delhi HC noted that the legislature has designed a carefully crafted mechanism to deal with complaints relating to sexual harassment through the POSH Act, including statutory safeguards such as confidentiality, given the sensitive nature of such cases. It emphasised that constituting a separate committee for inquiring into complaints of sexual harassment would be de hors the POSH Act and in complete violation of it.
Delhi HC cited reasons such as lack of: (a) confidentiality; (b) expertise for handling sensitivity of matters; (c) impartiality; and (d) adherence to timelines, as the main drawbacks of constituting an ad hoc committee as opposed to the IC constituted in accordance with POSH Act. It emphasised that the POSH Act establishes a complete and self-contained mechanism for addressing complaints of sexual harassment, and any deviation from this framework undermines statutory safeguards such as procedural fairness, confidentiality, and institutional competence.
Stigmatic nature of suspension order
While upholding the employer’s power to suspend, Delhi HC examined the language of the suspension order and found it to be stigmatic, as it referred to “serious misconduct and harassment” prior to completion of a formal inquiry. It emphasised that such language in a suspension order could create a negative opinion of the person before guilt is established, which would compromise the constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence. Delhi HC further observed that at the stage of suspension, the employer’s role is limited to determining whether the continuance of the employee in service would prejudice the inquiry or is undesirable in public interest, but it does not extend to adjudicating upon or publicly affirming the character of the allegations.
Delhi HC held that suspension, being an interim measure, must not carry any imputation of guilt or prejudice the outcome of the inquiry. Orders of suspension must therefore be neutral in tone and avoid language that suggests culpability.
Relief granted
In light of the above findings, the Delhi HC:
- set aside the Committee and its report;
- quashed the suspension order on grounds that it was stigmatic; and
- granted liberty to the employer to issue a fresh suspension order in accordance with law.
Conclusion
The decision of the Delhi HC has significant compliance implications for employers across sectors, particularly in relation to workplace investigations and disciplinary action under the POSH Act framework.
First, the ruling reinforces the exclusive jurisdiction of the IC in handling complaints of alleged sexual harassment. Accordingly, employers must ensure that all such complaints are routed directly through the statutory mechanism, without introducing any informal or parallel inquiry processes.
Second, the judgment provides clarity that disciplinary powers, including suspension, remain available to employers, even in cases involving alleged sexual harassment. However, such powers must be exercised independently of the statutory inquiry framework under POSH Act and in accordance with service rules and principles of natural justice.
Third, the decision highlights the importance of careful drafting of suspension orders. Employers must ensure that such orders are non-stigmatic, do not prejudge guilt, and clearly reflect their interim and administrative nature.
Finally, the ruling underscores the need for robust internal governance frameworks, including:
- alignment of internal policies with the POSH Act;
- removal of any pre-screening or preliminary inquiry mechanisms in contravention of provisions under the POSH Act; and
- sensitisation and training of relevant stakeholders including members from human resources departments and management personnel on statutory compliance.
Overall, the judgment strengthens procedural safeguards under POSH Act and signals a strict judicial approach towards deviations from the statutory scheme, thereby increasing compliance expectations for corporate employers.
This Prism has been prepared by:
|
Gerald Manoharan |
Sonakshi Das |
Lijin Varughese |
For more details, please contact [email protected].
[1] W.P.(C) 14760/2025 (decided on April 24, 2026)
[2] (2024) 1 SCC 632
[3] 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3395
